Kent Bach
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 735225 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Kent Bach |
| NOMBRES | Kent |
| APELLIDO | Bach |
| FIRMA | BACH K |
| AFILIACIONES | San Francisco State University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 30 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 85 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 30 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1970 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2018 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Loaded Words
What, as a matter of linguistic meaning, is added by referring to people with a slurring term rather than with its neutral counterpart? Hybrid expressivism says that slurs have the same descriptive contents as their neutral counterparts and that what distinguishes them is an expressive component. This chapter argues that hybrid expressivism gets the order of explanation backwards and it offers an alternative, loaded descriptivism. This says that …
The Predicate View of Proper Names
The Millian view that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent has long been popular among philosophers of language. It might even be deemed the orthodox view, despite its well-known difficulties. Fregean and Russellian alternatives, though widely discussed, are much less popular. The Predicate View has not even been taken seriously, at least until fairly recently, but finally, it is receiving the attention it deserves. It says that a …
Minimal Semantics
Book Review| April 01 2007 Minimal Semantics Emma Borg, Minimal Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. x + 288 pp. Kent Bach Kent Bach Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 303–306. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-045 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Kent Bach; Minimal Semantics. The Philosophical Review …
Literal Meaning
The Excluded Middle
Optimality Theory and Pragmatics
Speaking Loosely
You Don't Say
Concepts
1. Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory. 2. Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be. 3. The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale. 4. The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale. 5. Prototypes and Compositionality. (Appendix 5A: Meaning Postulates. Appendix 5B: The 'Theory Theory' of Concepts.) 6. Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument. (Appendix 6A: Similarity.) 7. Innatenes…
Concepts
Book Review| October 01 2000 Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong CONCEPTS: WHERE COGNITIVE SCIENCE WENT WRONG. By Jerry A. Fodor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 174. Kent Bach Kent Bach Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 627–632. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-627 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search …
The Myth of Conventional Implicature
Picoeconomics
Conversational Impliciture
Confusion in terms inspires confusion in concepts. When a relevant distinction is not clearly marked or not marked at all, it is apt to be blurred or even missed altogether in our thinking. This is true in any area of inquiry, pragmatics in particular. No one disputes that there are various ways in which what is communicated in an utterance can go beyond sentence meaning, [1] The problem is to catalog the ways. It is generally recognized that lin…
Representation, Meaning, and Thought
Thought and Reference
Thought and Reference
Thought and Reference
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Thought and Reference. By Kent Bach. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. Pp. ix + 305. Price £27.50.) Michael Luntley Michael Luntley The London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 159, April 1990, Pages 266–270, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219820 Published: 01 April 1990
Change in View
The Structure of Emotions
Spreading the Word
More on Self-Deception
In his recent critique of my account of self-deception,' Nathan Hellman' seems content with my resolution of the paradoxes of self-deception but charges that I have either ignored or skillfully downplayed certain deeper problems (I 1 3). He finds me oblivious (i zo) to certain counterexamples to my analysis but graciously allows that I do seem to be completely opaque (I 17) to the puzzles that remain. In this reply I wish to answer his two main o…
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts
Russell was right (almost)
Referential/attributive
An Analysis of Self-Deception
You Don't Say
The Excluded Middle
An Analysis of Self-Deception
Picoeconomics
Meaning and the Moral Sciences
Analytic Social Philosophy—Basic Concepts
The Predicate View of Proper Names
The Millian view that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent has long been popular among philosophers of language. It might even be deemed the orthodox view, despite its well-known difficulties. Fregean and Russellian alternatives, though widely discussed, are much less popular. The Predicate View has not even been taken seriously, at least until fairly recently, but finally, it is receiving the attention it deserves. It says that a …
Part of What a Picture Is
Journal Article PART OF WHAT A PICTURE IS Get access Kent Bach Kent Bach Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 10, Issue 2, April 1970, Pages 119–137, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/10.2.119 Published: 01 April 1970
Referential/attributive
Literal Meaning
Minimal Semantics
Book Review| April 01 2007 Minimal Semantics Emma Borg, Minimal Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. x + 288 pp. Kent Bach Kent Bach Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (2): 303–306. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-045 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Kent Bach; Minimal Semantics. The Philosophical Review …
Change in View
The Structure of Emotions
Part of What a Picture Is
Journal Article PART OF WHAT A PICTURE IS Get access Kent Bach Kent Bach Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 10, Issue 2, April 1970, Pages 119–137, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/10.2.119 Published: 01 April 1970
Analytic Social Philosophy—Basic Concepts
"When to Ask, "What if Everyone Did That
Linguistic communication and speech acts
Meaning and the Moral Sciences
Referential/attributive
An Analysis of Self-Deception
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts
Russell was right (almost)
More on Self-Deception
In his recent critique of my account of self-deception,' Nathan Hellman' seems content with my resolution of the paradoxes of self-deception but charges that I have either ignored or skillfully downplayed certain deeper problems (I 1 3). He finds me oblivious (i zo) to certain counterexamples to my analysis but graciously allows that I do seem to be completely opaque (I 17) to the puzzles that remain. In this reply I wish to answer his two main o…
Spreading the Word
Change in View
The Structure of Emotions
Thought and Reference
Thought and Reference
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Thought and Reference. By Kent Bach. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. Pp. ix + 305. Price £27.50.) Michael Luntley Michael Luntley The London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 159, April 1990, Pages 266–270, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219820 Published: 01 April 1990
Thought and Reference
Conversational Impliciture
Confusion in terms inspires confusion in concepts. When a relevant distinction is not clearly marked or not marked at all, it is apt to be blurred or even missed altogether in our thinking. This is true in any area of inquiry, pragmatics in particular. No one disputes that there are various ways in which what is communicated in an utterance can go beyond sentence meaning, [1] The problem is to catalog the ways. It is generally recognized that lin…
Representation, Meaning, and Thought
Picoeconomics
The Myth of Conventional Implicature
Concepts
1. Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory. 2. Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have To Be. 3. The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale. 4. The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale. 5. Prototypes and Compositionality. (Appendix 5A: Meaning Postulates. Appendix 5B: The 'Theory Theory' of Concepts.) 6. Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument. (Appendix 6A: Similarity.) 7. Innatenes…
Concepts
Book Review| October 01 2000 Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong CONCEPTS: WHERE COGNITIVE SCIENCE WENT WRONG. By Jerry A. Fodor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Pp. xii, 174. Kent Bach Kent Bach Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 627–632. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-627 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search …
Speaking Loosely
You Don't Say
Optimality Theory and Pragmatics
Philosophy (20 obras) · Computer Science (15 obras) · Epistemology (15 obras) · Linguistics (11 obras) · Psychology (11 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 obras) · Library science (6 obras) · Citation (5 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (5 obras)