Robert Van Gulick
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 753728 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Robert Van Gulick |
| NOMBRES | Robert |
| APELLIDO | Van Gulick |
| FIRMA | VAN GULICK R |
| AFILIACIONES | Syracuse University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1962 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2022 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative Perspective
Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self
On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—a Reply to Tye
In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconcei…
Inward and Upward
How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness
Intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are the two traditional defining characteristics of the mental. Paradigmatically mental states have both, and both serve to anchor our basic concept of what it is for to be mental. When I have a visual experience of my office laid out before me, my mental state is clearly about or directed at in the intentional sense. My experience is an experience of my office. My experience also has a subjective pheno…
Why the Connection Argument Doesn't Work
In Rediscovery of the Mind John Searle denies the existence, and even the possibility, of mental states that are in principle closed to consciousness. As he puts it, The claim I will make can be stated in one sentence: notion of an unconscious state implies accessibility to consciousness. We have no notion of the unconscious except as that which is potentially conscious. (p. 152 italics original) As Searle is well aware, this puts him at at odds …
John Searle and his Critics
Journal Article Book Reviews John Searle and his Critics. Edited By E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. xiv + 405. Price £39.95.) Graham MacDonald Graham MacDonald University of Bradford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 175, April 1994, Pages 261–264, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219752 Published: 01 April 1994
A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness
Children of the Pear Garden
A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness
Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self
How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness
Intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are the two traditional defining characteristics of the mental. Paradigmatically mental states have both, and both serve to anchor our basic concept of what it is for to be mental. When I have a visual experience of my office laid out before me, my mental state is clearly about or directed at in the intentional sense. My experience is an experience of my office. My experience also has a subjective pheno…
Children of the Pear Garden
A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness
John Searle and his Critics
Journal Article Book Reviews John Searle and his Critics. Edited By E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. xiv + 405. Price £39.95.) Graham MacDonald Graham MacDonald University of Bradford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 175, April 1994, Pages 261–264, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219752 Published: 01 April 1994
How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness
Intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are the two traditional defining characteristics of the mental. Paradigmatically mental states have both, and both serve to anchor our basic concept of what it is for to be mental. When I have a visual experience of my office laid out before me, my mental state is clearly about or directed at in the intentional sense. My experience is an experience of my office. My experience also has a subjective pheno…
Why the Connection Argument Doesn't Work
In Rediscovery of the Mind John Searle denies the existence, and even the possibility, of mental states that are in principle closed to consciousness. As he puts it, The claim I will make can be stated in one sentence: notion of an unconscious state implies accessibility to consciousness. We have no notion of the unconscious except as that which is potentially conscious. (p. 152 italics original) As Searle is well aware, this puts him at at odds …
Inward and Upward
On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—a Reply to Tye
In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconcei…
Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the Self
Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative Perspective
Philosophy (7 obras) · Epistemology (5 obras) · Consciousness (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Metaphysics (3 obras) · Psychology (3 obras) · Biology (2 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 obras) · Cognitive science (2 obras)