Guillermo Owens
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 80160 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Guillermo Owens |
| NOMBRES | Guillermo |
| APELLIDO | Owens |
| FIRMA | OWENS G |
| AFILIACIONES | Naval Postgraduate School |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7151-2607 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 23 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 169 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 23 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1971 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Valor coalicional y estrategias parlamentarias
Proponemos la aplicación del valor coalicional al estudio del comportamiento estratégico de los partidos en la formación de coaliciones parlamentarias. Del criterio de optimización del valor se deriva una noción de estabilidad equivalente a la del equilibrio fuerte de nash para los juegos no cooperativos.Las restricciones a la cooperación por razones ideológicas o tácticas se incorporan al modelo formal. como ilustración, analizamos el parlamento…
Game Theory
Centrality in directed social networks. A game theoretic approach
The VL control measure for symmetric networks
Mass-mobilization with noisy conditional beliefs
Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
The not-quite non-atomic game
Centrality and power in social networks
Rethinking the partisan effects of higher turnout
A neo-Downsian model of group-oriented voting and racial backlash
Estimating the likelihood of fallacious ecological inference
Valor coalicional y estrategias parlamentarias
Iniciada a mediados de este siglo, la Teoría de Juegos ha venido esforzándose por reducir sensiblemente el mutuo alejamiento al que parecían estar condenadas las Matemáticas y algunas de las denominadas Ciencias Sociales, en particular la
Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Finagle's Law and the Finagle Point, a New Solution Concept for Two-Candidate Competition in Spatial Voting Games Without a Core
We investigate the geometry underlying Finagle's Law, which states, No matter what happens, you can come out ahead if you just know how to finagle, and we introduce a new solution concept for two-candidate sequential spatial voting games, the point. The finagle radius is the radius of a circle such that if a candidate locates at its center, some alternative in the circle can beat any alternative in the space. The finagle point is the point with m…
Evaluation of the Catalonian Parliament, 1980–1984
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context
Majority-rule spatial voting games lacking a core still always present a "near-core" outcome, more commonly known as the Copeland winner. This is the alternative that defeats or ties the greatest number of alternatives in the space. Previous research has not tested the Copeland winner as a solution concept for spatial voting games without a core, lacking a way to calculate where the Copeland winner was with an infinite number of alternatives. We …
To vote or not to vote
Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
A game theoretic approach to measuring degree of centrality in social networks
Average Competence, Variability in Individual Competence, and Accuracy of Statistically Pooled Group Decisions
We correct propositions advanced by Sattler in 1966 on the accuracy of group judgments as a function of the mean competence and distribution of competence of group members. We provide the special distributions which, for fixed total group competence, minimize/maximize group majority rule accuracy. We also show how group majority competence can be above/below that of group mean competence
Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game
The Shapley value of the presidential election "game" is approximated by the method of multilinear extensions; the likely error in this approximation is computed by studying the error in the electoral college game. A comparison with the Banzhaf ratio is also given. The several biases inherent in the electoral system are analyzed from a mathematical point of view. It is shown that the system incorporates a strong bias in favor of the larger states…
Spieltheorie
To vote or not to vote
Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game
The Shapley value of the presidential election "game" is approximated by the method of multilinear extensions; the likely error in this approximation is computed by studying the error in the electoral college game. A comparison with the Banzhaf ratio is also given. The several biases inherent in the electoral system are analyzed from a mathematical point of view. It is shown that the system incorporates a strong bias in favor of the larger states…
Rethinking the partisan effects of higher turnout
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context
Majority-rule spatial voting games lacking a core still always present a "near-core" outcome, more commonly known as the Copeland winner. This is the alternative that defeats or ties the greatest number of alternatives in the space. Previous research has not tested the Copeland winner as a solution concept for spatial voting games without a core, lacking a way to calculate where the Copeland winner was with an infinite number of alternatives. We …
Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Finagle's Law and the Finagle Point, a New Solution Concept for Two-Candidate Competition in Spatial Voting Games Without a Core
We investigate the geometry underlying Finagle's Law, which states, No matter what happens, you can come out ahead if you just know how to finagle, and we introduce a new solution concept for two-candidate sequential spatial voting games, the point. The finagle radius is the radius of a circle such that if a candidate locates at its center, some alternative in the circle can beat any alternative in the space. The finagle point is the point with m…
A neo-Downsian model of group-oriented voting and racial backlash
Centrality and power in social networks
Estimating the likelihood of fallacious ecological inference
Evaluation of the Catalonian Parliament, 1980–1984
Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
Spieltheorie
Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game
The Shapley value of the presidential election "game" is approximated by the method of multilinear extensions; the likely error in this approximation is computed by studying the error in the electoral college game. A comparison with the Banzhaf ratio is also given. The several biases inherent in the electoral system are analyzed from a mathematical point of view. It is shown that the system incorporates a strong bias in favor of the larger states…
A game theoretic approach to measuring degree of centrality in social networks
Average Competence, Variability in Individual Competence, and Accuracy of Statistically Pooled Group Decisions
We correct propositions advanced by Sattler in 1966 on the accuracy of group judgments as a function of the mean competence and distribution of competence of group members. We provide the special distributions which, for fixed total group competence, minimize/maximize group majority rule accuracy. We also show how group majority competence can be above/below that of group mean competence
Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
To vote or not to vote
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context
Majority-rule spatial voting games lacking a core still always present a "near-core" outcome, more commonly known as the Copeland winner. This is the alternative that defeats or ties the greatest number of alternatives in the space. Previous research has not tested the Copeland winner as a solution concept for spatial voting games without a core, lacking a way to calculate where the Copeland winner was with an infinite number of alternatives. We …
Evaluation of the Catalonian Parliament, 1980–1984
Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Finagle's Law and the Finagle Point, a New Solution Concept for Two-Candidate Competition in Spatial Voting Games Without a Core
We investigate the geometry underlying Finagle's Law, which states, No matter what happens, you can come out ahead if you just know how to finagle, and we introduce a new solution concept for two-candidate sequential spatial voting games, the point. The finagle radius is the radius of a circle such that if a candidate locates at its center, some alternative in the circle can beat any alternative in the space. The finagle point is the point with m…
Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
Valor coalicional y estrategias parlamentarias
Iniciada a mediados de este siglo, la Teoría de Juegos ha venido esforzándose por reducir sensiblemente el mutuo alejamiento al que parecían estar condenadas las Matemáticas y algunas de las denominadas Ciencias Sociales, en particular la
Estimating the likelihood of fallacious ecological inference
A neo-Downsian model of group-oriented voting and racial backlash
Rethinking the partisan effects of higher turnout
Centrality and power in social networks
The not-quite non-atomic game
Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
Mass-mobilization with noisy conditional beliefs
The VL control measure for symmetric networks
Centrality in directed social networks. A game theoretic approach
Game Theory
Valor coalicional y estrategias parlamentarias
Proponemos la aplicación del valor coalicional al estudio del comportamiento estratégico de los partidos en la formación de coaliciones parlamentarias. Del criterio de optimización del valor se deriva una noción de estabilidad equivalente a la del equilibrio fuerte de nash para los juegos no cooperativos.Las restricciones a la cooperación por razones ideológicas o tácticas se incorporan al modelo formal. como ilustración, analizamos el parlamento…
Game Theory and Voting Systems (14 obras) · Mathematical economics (14 obras) · Mathematics (13 obras) · Political science (13 obras) · Computer Science (10 obras) · Economics (9 obras) · Law (9 obras) · Voting (9 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (8 obras)