Manfred J Holler
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 876965 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Manfred J Holler |
| NOMBRES | Manfred J |
| APELLIDO | Holler |
| FIRMA | HOLLER M J |
| AFILIACIONES | Universität Hamburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9913-9824 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 63 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 3 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1982 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2016 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
John von Neumann (1903–1957)
Volume I contains original biographical profiles of many of the most important and influential economists from the seventeenth century to the present day. These inform the reader about their lives, works and impact on the further development of the discipline. The emphasis is on their lasting contributions to our understanding of the complex system known as the economy. The entries also shed light on the means and ways in which the functioning of…
Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes
The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, and Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is blind to preferences misses a vital component of power, namely strategic interaction. In this vein, there has been an attempt to develop so-called strategic p…
Power and Preferences Again
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie
The articles and comments in this volume address big issues of the debate on European Governance. Adopting a rational choice perspective, the topics range from, for instance, the sectoral organization of the Council of Ministers, a contract-theoretic analysis of the Commission's behavior and the distribution of voting power, to the pros and cons of competitive government and interest group influence on EU legislation.
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie
In this volume economists with a background in game and decision theory apply their methods to central issues of the political economy of institutional evolution. The discussion ranges from abstract models of, for instance, the evolution of clubs and of conventions to quite specific case studies of real world institutions such as legislation in the European union and internet trade. It combines results of experimental economics with theoretical c…
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie
Inhaltsübersicht: Karl-Ernst Schenk and Dieter Schmidtchen : 20 Jahre Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie - Manfred J. Holler : On Power and Fairness and their Relationship - An Introductory Chapter - Silvia Fedeli and Francesco Forte : Minimizing Frustration versus Median Voter's Equilibria: A 'reasonable Choice' Procedure. Comment by Shanti P. Chakravarty and Peter Skott - Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen : Power in Political and Busi…
Myths and Meanings of Voting Power
This is a reply to Dan Felsenthal's and Moshé Machover's verdict on the Holler-Widgrén contribution to the Symposium on `Power Indices and the European Union' in the July 1999 issue of this Journal. It questions the benefits of discussing the game-theoretical nature of power indices and argues that the public good index represents I-power, and not P-power. Moreover, it defends the application of the permutation model to represent preferences behi…
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic
Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making
In this paper we argue that spatial voting games and power index models are not necessarily exclusive ways to analyse EU decision-making. We find that the two main criticisms pointed out by scholars of spatial voting games, namely that power indices do not take into account preferences or the role of the agenda-setter, are not fully valid as spatial voting games deal with complete whereas power indices deal with incomplete contracts. Ideas for co…
Two Stories, One Power Index
This paper demonstrates that the mathematical properties of the member bargaining power measure (MBP) are identical with those of the public good index (PGI). However, the underlying theoretical concepts of the two measures are different. The MBP refers to bargaining over shares of the coalition value, and thus has a private good perspective, whereas the PGI considers power with respect to providing a public good as coalition value. The identity …
Voting on standardization
Supply-side strategic unemployment in small business
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic
Do economics students choose rationally? A research note
Forming Coalitions and Measuring Voting Power
Forming Coalitions and Measuring Voting Power
Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making
In this paper we argue that spatial voting games and power index models are not necessarily exclusive ways to analyse EU decision-making. We find that the two main criticisms pointed out by scholars of spatial voting games, namely that power indices do not take into account preferences or the role of the agenda-setter, are not fully valid as spatial voting games deal with complete whereas power indices deal with incomplete contracts. Ideas for co…
The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, and Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is blind to preferences misses a vital component of power, namely strategic interaction. In this vein, there has been an attempt to develop so-called strategic p…
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic
Power and Preferences Again
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic
Two Stories, One Power Index
This paper demonstrates that the mathematical properties of the member bargaining power measure (MBP) are identical with those of the public good index (PGI). However, the underlying theoretical concepts of the two measures are different. The MBP refers to bargaining over shares of the coalition value, and thus has a private good perspective, whereas the PGI considers power with respect to providing a public good as coalition value. The identity …
Forming Coalitions and Measuring Voting Power
Do economics students choose rationally? A research note
Supply-side strategic unemployment in small business
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic
Voting on standardization
Two Stories, One Power Index
This paper demonstrates that the mathematical properties of the member bargaining power measure (MBP) are identical with those of the public good index (PGI). However, the underlying theoretical concepts of the two measures are different. The MBP refers to bargaining over shares of the coalition value, and thus has a private good perspective, whereas the PGI considers power with respect to providing a public good as coalition value. The identity …
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic
Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making
In this paper we argue that spatial voting games and power index models are not necessarily exclusive ways to analyse EU decision-making. We find that the two main criticisms pointed out by scholars of spatial voting games, namely that power indices do not take into account preferences or the role of the agenda-setter, are not fully valid as spatial voting games deal with complete whereas power indices deal with incomplete contracts. Ideas for co…
Myths and Meanings of Voting Power
This is a reply to Dan Felsenthal's and Moshé Machover's verdict on the Holler-Widgrén contribution to the Symposium on `Power Indices and the European Union' in the July 1999 issue of this Journal. It questions the benefits of discussing the game-theoretical nature of power indices and argues that the public good index represents I-power, and not P-power. Moreover, it defends the application of the permutation model to represent preferences behi…
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie
Inhaltsübersicht: Karl-Ernst Schenk and Dieter Schmidtchen : 20 Jahre Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie - Manfred J. Holler : On Power and Fairness and their Relationship - An Introductory Chapter - Silvia Fedeli and Francesco Forte : Minimizing Frustration versus Median Voter's Equilibria: A 'reasonable Choice' Procedure. Comment by Shanti P. Chakravarty and Peter Skott - Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen : Power in Political and Busi…
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie
The articles and comments in this volume address big issues of the debate on European Governance. Adopting a rational choice perspective, the topics range from, for instance, the sectoral organization of the Council of Ministers, a contract-theoretic analysis of the Commission's behavior and the distribution of voting power, to the pros and cons of competitive government and interest group influence on EU legislation.
Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie
In this volume economists with a background in game and decision theory apply their methods to central issues of the political economy of institutional evolution. The discussion ranges from abstract models of, for instance, the evolution of clubs and of conventions to quite specific case studies of real world institutions such as legislation in the European union and internet trade. It combines results of experimental economics with theoretical c…
Election campaigns, agenda setting and electoral outcomes
The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, and Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is blind to preferences misses a vital component of power, namely strategic interaction. In this vein, there has been an attempt to develop so-called strategic p…
Power and Preferences Again
John von Neumann (1903–1957)
Volume I contains original biographical profiles of many of the most important and influential economists from the seventeenth century to the present day. These inform the reader about their lives, works and impact on the further development of the discipline. The emphasis is on their lasting contributions to our understanding of the complex system known as the economy. The entries also shed light on the means and ways in which the functioning of…
Economics (12 obras) · Political science (8 obras) · Politics (8 obras) · Power (physics (7 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Microeconomics (6 obras) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 obras) · Mathematical economics (5 obras) · Voting (5 obras)