Ken Binmore
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 89662 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Ken Binmore |
| NOMBRES | Ken |
| APELLIDO | Binmore |
| FIRMA | BINMORE K |
| AFILIACIONES | University College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8442-7359 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 43 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 119 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 42 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1985 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Obskurantisme
The Prisoner's Dilemma
The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the most fiercely debated thought experiments in philosophy and the social sciences, presenting the simple insight that when two or more agents interact, the actions that most benefit each individual may not benefit the group. The fact that when you do what is best for you, and I do what is best for me, we end up in a situation that is worse for both of us makes the Prisoner's Dilemma relevant to a broad range of …
Evolution and Rationality
This volume explores from multiple perspectives the subtle and interesting relationship between the theory of rational choice and Darwinian evolution. In rational choice theory, agents are assumed to make choices that maximize their utility; in evolution, natural selection 'chooses' between phenotypes according to the criterion of fitness maximization. So there is a parallel between utility in rational choice theory and fitness in Darwinian theor…
Kitcher on Natural Morality
This commentary on Philip Kitcher’s Ethical Project compares his theory of the evolution of morality with my less ambitious theory of the evolution of fairness norms that seeks to flesh out John Mackie’s insight that one should use game theory as a framework within which to assess anthropological data. It lays particular stress on the importance of the folk theorem of repeated game theory, which provides a template for the set of stable social co…
Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory
Book Review| September 01 2012 Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory: From Chess to Social Science, 1900–1960 Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory: From Chess to Social Science, 1900–1960. By Leonard, Robert. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. x; 390 pp.$95.00. Ken Binmore Ken Binmore Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 546–550. ht…
Social norms or social preferences
Behavioural Economics and its Applications
Proceedings of the Yrjo Jahnsson Foundation 50th Anniversary Conference held on June 22–23, 2004 in Espoo, Finland. Behavioural economics is here to stay, but it is not easy to come up with a definition of exactly what it is. The range of work within economics that might reasonably be called behavioural is very wide. At one end of the spectrum, there are conservative experimenters who defend traditional economic theory by looking at situations in…
Natural Justice
The following responses to the scholars who were kind enough to comment on my Natural Justice in this symposium have been kept to a minimum by addressing only issues where I think a misunderstanding may have arisen
Justice as a Natural Phenomenon
This paper summarizes a theory of fairness that replaces the metaphysical foundations of the egalitarian theory of John Rawls and the utilitarian theory of John Harsanyi with evolutionary arguments. As such, it represents an attempt to realize John Mackie’s call for a theory based on the data provided by anthroplogists and the propositions proved by game theorists. The basic claim is that fairness norms evolved as a device for selecting one of th…
Why do people cooperate
Can people be relied upon to be nice to each other? Thomas Hobbes famously did not think so, but his view that rational cooperation does not require that people be nice has never been popular. The debate has continued to simmer since Joseph Butler took up the Hobbist gauntlet in 1725. This article defends the modern version of Hobbism derived largely from game theory against a new school of Butlerians who call themselves behavioral economists. It…
Natural Justice
This book attempts to create an evolutionary theory of fairness. Sharing food is commonplace in the animal kingdom because it insures animals that share against hunger. Anthropologists report that hunter-gatherer societies which survived into the 20th century shared on a very egalitarian basis. What can such information tell us about the sense of fairness with which modern man is born? Using game theory as a basic tool, the book argues that fairn…
Reciprocity and the Social Contract
This article is extracted from a forthcoming book, ‘Natural Justice’. It is a nontechnical introduction to the part of game theory immediately relevant to social contract theory. The latter part of the article reviews how concepts such as trust, responsibility, and authority can be seen as emergent phenomena in models that take formal account only of equilibria in indefinitely repeated games
Defending Transitivity against Zeno's Paradox
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that al…
The Biggest Auction Ever
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organising the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £221⁄2 billion ($34 billion or 21⁄2% of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus `beauty contests', the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made
Natural Justice and Political Stability
This paper argues that the human species has two natural coordination mechanisms: leadership and fairness. A leader who ignores fairness when coordinating the behavior of a large organization risks creating the conditions for the emergence of a destabilizing subgroup that is able to coalesce using fairness as its coordinating device.
Evolutionary Social Theory
Journal Article Evolutionary Social Theory: Reply to Robert Sugden Get access Ken Binmore Ken Binmore Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 111, Issue 469, February 2001, Pages F244–F248, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00605 Published: 13 March 2002
Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study
This paper finds experimental support for Von Neumann's minimax theory in two‐person, zero‐sum games
Why Experiment in Economics
Just Playing
Evolutionary Ethics
Egalitarianism versus Utilitarianism
This paper is a comparative analysis of egalitarianism and utilitarianism from a naturalistic perspective that offers some insight into the manner in which we come to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare
Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities
A long tradition in economics assumes that any potential gains from trade will be exploited. This emphasis on efficiency clashes with the possibility that hard bargaining over the division of the surplus may cause some potential deals to be lost. We examine an Outside Option Game designed to study the tension between maximising the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of this surplus among those who contributed to its creation. An…
The Evolution of Fairness Norms
The evidence is strong that modern hunter-gatherer societies approximate the Marxian ideal in which each contributes according to ability and receives according to need. It has been argued that such a form of social organization can be explained by neither reciprocity nor kinship. Attempts to found evolutionary social contract theories on sociobiological principles therefore seem doomed from the outset, since the same authors believe that modern …
Right or Seemly
This paper suggests that rights are best seen as being part of the description of a social state rather than as constituents of the mechanism by means of which society selects a social state. A theory of this kind is outlined in which a social state is modeled as an equilibrium in the game of life played by the citizens of a society
Playing Fair
Journal Article Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume I Get access Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume I. By (Ken). Binmore (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1994. Pp. xxii+364. £26.50. hardback, US $39.95 hardback. ISBN 0 262 02363 6.) Robert Sugden Robert Sugden University of East Anglia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 106, Issue …
Why Experiment in Economics
Why do people cooperate
Can people be relied upon to be nice to each other? Thomas Hobbes famously did not think so, but his view that rational cooperation does not require that people be nice has never been popular. The debate has continued to simmer since Joseph Butler took up the Hobbist gauntlet in 1725. This article defends the modern version of Hobbism derived largely from game theory against a new school of Butlerians who call themselves behavioral economists. It…
Social norms or social preferences
The Biggest Auction Ever
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organising the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £221⁄2 billion ($34 billion or 21⁄2% of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus `beauty contests', the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made
Defending Transitivity against Zeno's Paradox
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that al…
Social Contract I
Journal Article Social Contract I: Harsanyi and Rawls Get access Ken Binmore Ken Binmore University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 395, 1 April 1989, Pages 84–102, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234072 Published: 01 March 1989
Advances in Economic Theory
Journal Article Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress Get access Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Edited by F. BEWLEY TRUMAN. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Pp. vii + 428. £27.50, US$34.50 hardback. ISBN 0521 340446.) Ken Binmore Ken Binmore London School of Economics and Political Science Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issue 39…
Reciprocity and the Social Contract
This article is extracted from a forthcoming book, ‘Natural Justice’. It is a nontechnical introduction to the part of game theory immediately relevant to social contract theory. The latter part of the article reviews how concepts such as trust, responsibility, and authority can be seen as emergent phenomena in models that take formal account only of equilibria in indefinitely repeated games
Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory
Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities
A long tradition in economics assumes that any potential gains from trade will be exploited. This emphasis on efficiency clashes with the possibility that hard bargaining over the division of the surplus may cause some potential deals to be lost. We examine an Outside Option Game designed to study the tension between maximising the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of this surplus among those who contributed to its creation. An…
The Evolution of Fairness Norms
The evidence is strong that modern hunter-gatherer societies approximate the Marxian ideal in which each contributes according to ability and receives according to need. It has been argued that such a form of social organization can be explained by neither reciprocity nor kinship. Attempts to found evolutionary social contract theories on sociobiological principles therefore seem doomed from the outset, since the same authors believe that modern …
Evolution and utilitarianism
Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory
Book Review| September 01 2012 Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory: From Chess to Social Science, 1900–1960 Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory: From Chess to Social Science, 1900–1960. By Leonard, Robert. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. x; 390 pp.$95.00. Ken Binmore Ken Binmore Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (2012) 44 (3): 546–550. ht…
Behavioural Economics and its Applications
Proceedings of the Yrjo Jahnsson Foundation 50th Anniversary Conference held on June 22–23, 2004 in Espoo, Finland. Behavioural economics is here to stay, but it is not easy to come up with a definition of exactly what it is. The range of work within economics that might reasonably be called behavioural is very wide. At one end of the spectrum, there are conservative experimenters who defend traditional economic theory by looking at situations in…
Evolutionary Social Theory
Journal Article Evolutionary Social Theory: Reply to Robert Sugden Get access Ken Binmore Ken Binmore Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 111, Issue 469, February 2001, Pages F244–F248, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00605 Published: 13 March 2002
Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study
This paper finds experimental support for Von Neumann's minimax theory in two‐person, zero‐sum games
Equilibria in Extensive Games
Journal Article Equilibria in Extensive Games Get access K. G. Binmore K. G. Binmore London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 95, Issue Supplement, 1 December 1985, Pages 51–59, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232869 Published: 01 December 1985
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the bargainers' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiations. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to rea…
A Game Theoretic Approach to Political Economy
The Economics of Bargaining
Journal Article The Economics of Bargaining Get access The Economics of Bargaining. Edited by Ken Binmore and Partha Dasgupta. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. 260. à à à à £27.50 hardback.) Howard C. Petith Howard C. Petith University College of Swansea Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 388, 1 December 1987, Pages 995–996, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233088 Published: …
On Ethics and Economics
Economic Organizations as Games
Part 1 Equilibrium theory: the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games - theory, application, P.Dasgupta and E.Maskin. Part 2 Imperfect competition: on the rate of convergence of oligopoly equilibria in large markets - an example, P.Dasgupta and Y.Ushio natural oligopolies, A.Shaked and J.Sutton relaxing price competition through product differentiation, A.Shaked and J.Sutton the theory of technological competition, P.Dasgupta st…
The Individual in the Economy
The Essential Background: 1. Introduction to psychology 2. Introduction to microeconomics 3. Introduction to macroeconomics 4. Methods for economic psychology 5. Is human behaviour rational? Part II. The Economic Behaviour of Individuals: 6. Work 7. Buying 8. Saving 9. Giving 10. Gambling Part III. How the Economy Affects Individual Behaviour: 11. Taxation 12. Money 13. Advertising 14. Growing up in the economy 15. Primitive economies 16. Economi…
Advances in Economic Theory
Journal Article Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress Get access Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Edited by F. BEWLEY TRUMAN. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Pp. vii + 428. £27.50, US$34.50 hardback. ISBN 0521 340446.) Ken Binmore Ken Binmore London School of Economics and Political Science Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issue 39…
Game Theory with Applications to Economics
Social Contract I
Journal Article Social Contract I: Harsanyi and Rawls Get access Ken Binmore Ken Binmore University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 395, 1 April 1989, Pages 84–102, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234072 Published: 01 March 1989
Evolution and utilitarianism
Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory
Rational Choice Theory
Comments on R. J. Herrnstein's article on rational choice theory and argues that people find Herrnstein's modeling of the tennis-player riddle unnatural. Alternative modeling approaches are considered in which the victims' prescription for behavior is consistent with rational choice theory
Rational Choice Theory
Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents
In this book, Professor Thomson and Professor Lensberg extrapolate upon the Nash (1950) treatment of the bargaining problem to consider the situation where the number of bargainers may vary. The authors formulate axioms to specify how solutions should respond to such changes, and provide new characterizations of all the major solutions as well as generalizations of these solutions. The book also contains several other comparative studies of solut…
The Theory of Choice
Introduction. Part I: Individual Choice: 1. Rationality. 2. Consumer Theory. 3. How People Choose. 4. Risk, Ignorance and Imagination. 5. Homo Economicus Homo Sociologicus. 6. Autonomy. Part II: Interactive Choice: 7. Game Theory. 8. Bargaining. 9. Game Theory Applied. 10. Organizations. 11. Cultural Exchange. 12. Anarchic Order. Part III: Collective Choice: 13. Social Choice. 14. Democracy. 15. Power. 16. Planning. 17. Agendas. 18. Social Justic…
Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 1
The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy
Journal Article The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy: International Workshop. Get access The Ethical Foundations of the Market Economy: International Workshop. Edited by Siebert (Horst). (Kiel: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tubingen, 1994. Pp. viii + 224. ISBN 3 16 146232 7.) Ken Binmore Ken Binmore University College London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 43…
Right or Seemly
This paper suggests that rights are best seen as being part of the description of a social state rather than as constituents of the mechanism by means of which society selects a social state. A theory of this kind is outlined in which a social state is modeled as an equilibrium in the game of life played by the citizens of a society
Playing Fair
Journal Article Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume I Get access Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume I. By (Ken). Binmore (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1994. Pp. xxii+364. £26.50. hardback, US $39.95 hardback. ISBN 0 262 02363 6.) Robert Sugden Robert Sugden University of East Anglia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 106, Issue …
Evolutionary Ethics
Egalitarianism versus Utilitarianism
This paper is a comparative analysis of egalitarianism and utilitarianism from a naturalistic perspective that offers some insight into the manner in which we come to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare
Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities
A long tradition in economics assumes that any potential gains from trade will be exploited. This emphasis on efficiency clashes with the possibility that hard bargaining over the division of the surplus may cause some potential deals to be lost. We examine an Outside Option Game designed to study the tension between maximising the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of this surplus among those who contributed to its creation. An…
The Evolution of Fairness Norms
The evidence is strong that modern hunter-gatherer societies approximate the Marxian ideal in which each contributes according to ability and receives according to need. It has been argued that such a form of social organization can be explained by neither reciprocity nor kinship. Attempts to found evolutionary social contract theories on sociobiological principles therefore seem doomed from the outset, since the same authors believe that modern …
Why Experiment in Economics
Economics (33 obras) · Mathematical economics (23 obras) · Sociology (22 obras) · Political science (21 obras) · Law (18 obras) · Philosophy (16 obras) · Positive economics (16 obras) · Economic theories and models (14 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (14 obras) · Neoclassical economics (14 obras)