Liam Wren-Lewis

Datos Biográficos

ID	9191529
NOMBRE	Liam Wren-Lewis
NOMBRES	Liam
APELLIDO	Wren-Lewis
FIRMA	WREN-LEWIS L
AFILIACIONES	Paris School of Economics
VERIFICADO	No
TOTAL DE OBRAS	24
TOTAL DE CITAS	0
TOTAL COMO AUTOR	24
TOTAL COMO EDITOR	0
PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN	2006
AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN	2025
ÍNDICE H	0

Complementarities in Infrastructure
Open AccessOliver Vanden Eynde, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLEThe World Bank Economic Review2025
Complementarities between infrastructure projects have been understudied. Using temporal variation in the independent rollout of large-scale road construction and electrification programs in rural India, this study estimates their individual and joint impacts on a range of outcomes. Notably, there is strong evidence that villages increase dry-season cropping when they receive both electricity and roads, but not when they receive one without the o…
The Impact of Childhood Inter-Ethnic Contact on Managers' Hiring Decisions
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2024
Decentralization, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Public Services
Open AccessCamille Hémet, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.PREPRINTSSRN Electronic Journal2023
The Long Run Impact of Childhood Interracial Contact on Residential Segregation
Open AccessLuca Merlino, Max Friedrich Steinhardt et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2022
More than Just Friends? School Peers and Adult Interracial Relationships
Luca Paolo Merlino, Max Friedrich Steinhardt et al.ARTICLEJournal of Labor Economics2019
This paper investigates whether interracial contact in childhood impacts adult romantic relationships. We exploit quasi-random variation in the share of black students across cohorts within US schools. We find that more black peers of the same gender lead whites to have more relationships with blacks as adults. While we do not find impacts on labor market outcomes, there are significant effects on reported racial attitudes. Furthermore, an increa…
Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses
Emmanuelle Auriol, Antonio Estache et al.ARTICLERevue économique2018Referencias: 3
Cet article étudie l’impact des caractéristiques institutionnelles de la régulation nationale et internationale sur l’efficacité des deux types de régulation. Il s’intéresse à quatre dimensions de faiblesse institutionnelle : la capacité pratique de réguler, la capacité à rendre des comptes, la capacité d’engagement et la capacité fiscale. En identifiant les coûts et les bénéfices générés par une régulation supranationale, l’analyse montre que ce…
Réduire la corruption dans le secteur réglementé des infrastructures
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisCHAPTERL’éthique de la gestion publique2016
Le problème de la corruption dans le secteur réglementé des infrastructures est apparu avec la réglementation elle-même. La plupart des infrastructures nécessitent des investissements considérables et des contrats opérationnels et d’entretien à long terme, deux sources évidentes de rente financière. Nombreuses sont également les infrastructures relevant de secteurs politiquement sensibles, qui se prêtent facilement à un contrôle des prix ou à des…
Designing Contracts for the Global Fund
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2016
More than Just Friends? School Peers and Adult Interracial Relationships
Open AccessLuca Paolo Merlino, Luca Merlino et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2016
Solving Commitment Problems in Disaster Risk Finance
Daniel Clarke, Daniel J Clarke et al.BOOK2016
Those at risk from natural disasters are typically under-protected, possibly because they expect benefactors such as governments and donors to come to their aid. Yet when relief comes, it is often insufficient, delayed or misallocated. Benefactors may wish to commit to provide an efficient amount of fast well-targeted relief, and leave the rest up to recipients, but such commitments are difficult. This article analyses how transferring risk to th…
Grabbing Land in Malawi
Open AccessBlessings Chinsinga, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2015
Delegating Relational Contracts to Corruptible Intermediaries
Open AccessMarta Troya-Martinez, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2015
Grabbing land in Malawi
Blessings Chinsinga, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.CHAPTERCorruption, grabbing and…2013
International audience
Evaluating the impact of Land Administration Programs on agricultural productivity and rural development
Jérémie Gignoux, Karen Macours et al.REPORT2013
Investment in land administration projects is often considered key for agricultural productivity and rural development. The evidence on such interventions is however remarkably mixed. This paper discusses a number of challenges and derives related guidelines for the impact evaluation of land administration programs. We focus on four types of challenges: 1) a conceptual challenge related to the need to unbundle property rights and to establish the…
Hold-Up Problems in International Electricity Trade
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2013
Learning from Lemons
Open AccessDaniel Clarke, Daniel J Clarke et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2013
Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean
Liam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisBOOK2013
This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and governance at the sector level. A simple model illustrates how both an increase in regulatory autonomy and privatization may influence the effect of corruption. The interaction is analyzed empirically using a fixed-effects estimator on a panel of 153 electricity distribution firms across 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1995--2007. Greater corruption is associated …
Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean
Liam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisARTICLEThe World Bank Economic Review2013
This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and infrastructure policy reforms. I construct a simple model to illustrate how both an incerase in regulatory autonomy and privatisation may influence the effect of corruption. This interaction is then analysed empirically using a panel of 153 electricity distribution firms across 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1995 and 2007. I find evidence that greater corrupti…
Supranational Infrastructure Regulation
Open AccessAntonio Estache, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2012
Why Did Britain's Households Get Richer? Decomposing UK Household Income Growth between 1968 and 2008-09
Open AccessMike Brewer, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2011
Is Moree Enough
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2011
Racing Away? Income Inequality and the Evolution of High Incomes
Open AccessMike Brewer, Luke Sibieta et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2008
How Change Happens in the Private Sector
Open AccessKate Raworth, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2006
The Private Sector and Poverty Reduction
Open AccessKate Raworth, Sumithra Dhanarajan et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2006

How Change Happens in the Private Sector
Open AccessKate Raworth, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2006
The Private Sector and Poverty Reduction
Open AccessKate Raworth, Sumithra Dhanarajan et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2006
Racing Away? Income Inequality and the Evolution of High Incomes
Open AccessMike Brewer, Luke Sibieta et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2008
Why Did Britain's Households Get Richer? Decomposing UK Household Income Growth between 1968 and 2008-09
Open AccessMike Brewer, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2011
Is Moree Enough
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2011
Supranational Infrastructure Regulation
Open AccessAntonio Estache, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2012
Grabbing land in Malawi
Blessings Chinsinga, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.CHAPTERCorruption, grabbing and…2013
International audience
Evaluating the impact of Land Administration Programs on agricultural productivity and rural development
Jérémie Gignoux, Karen Macours et al.REPORT2013
Investment in land administration projects is often considered key for agricultural productivity and rural development. The evidence on such interventions is however remarkably mixed. This paper discusses a number of challenges and derives related guidelines for the impact evaluation of land administration programs. We focus on four types of challenges: 1) a conceptual challenge related to the need to unbundle property rights and to establish the…
Hold-Up Problems in International Electricity Trade
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2013
Learning from Lemons
Open AccessDaniel Clarke, Daniel J Clarke et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2013
Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean
Liam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisBOOK2013
This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and governance at the sector level. A simple model illustrates how both an increase in regulatory autonomy and privatization may influence the effect of corruption. The interaction is analyzed empirically using a fixed-effects estimator on a panel of 153 electricity distribution firms across 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1995--2007. Greater corruption is associated …
Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean
Liam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisARTICLEThe World Bank Economic Review2013
This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and infrastructure policy reforms. I construct a simple model to illustrate how both an incerase in regulatory autonomy and privatisation may influence the effect of corruption. This interaction is then analysed empirically using a panel of 153 electricity distribution firms across 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1995 and 2007. I find evidence that greater corrupti…
Grabbing Land in Malawi
Open AccessBlessings Chinsinga, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2015
Delegating Relational Contracts to Corruptible Intermediaries
Open AccessMarta Troya-Martinez, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2015
Réduire la corruption dans le secteur réglementé des infrastructures
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisCHAPTERL’éthique de la gestion publique2016
Le problème de la corruption dans le secteur réglementé des infrastructures est apparu avec la réglementation elle-même. La plupart des infrastructures nécessitent des investissements considérables et des contrats opérationnels et d’entretien à long terme, deux sources évidentes de rente financière. Nombreuses sont également les infrastructures relevant de secteurs politiquement sensibles, qui se prêtent facilement à un contrôle des prix ou à des…
Designing Contracts for the Global Fund
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-LewisARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2016
More than Just Friends? School Peers and Adult Interracial Relationships
Open AccessLuca Paolo Merlino, Luca Merlino et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2016
Solving Commitment Problems in Disaster Risk Finance
Daniel Clarke, Daniel J Clarke et al.BOOK2016
Those at risk from natural disasters are typically under-protected, possibly because they expect benefactors such as governments and donors to come to their aid. Yet when relief comes, it is often insufficient, delayed or misallocated. Benefactors may wish to commit to provide an efficient amount of fast well-targeted relief, and leave the rest up to recipients, but such commitments are difficult. This article analyses how transferring risk to th…
Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses
Emmanuelle Auriol, Antonio Estache et al.ARTICLERevue économique2018Referencias: 3
Cet article étudie l’impact des caractéristiques institutionnelles de la régulation nationale et internationale sur l’efficacité des deux types de régulation. Il s’intéresse à quatre dimensions de faiblesse institutionnelle : la capacité pratique de réguler, la capacité à rendre des comptes, la capacité d’engagement et la capacité fiscale. En identifiant les coûts et les bénéfices générés par une régulation supranationale, l’analyse montre que ce…
More than Just Friends? School Peers and Adult Interracial Relationships
Luca Paolo Merlino, Max Friedrich Steinhardt et al.ARTICLEJournal of Labor Economics2019
This paper investigates whether interracial contact in childhood impacts adult romantic relationships. We exploit quasi-random variation in the share of black students across cohorts within US schools. We find that more black peers of the same gender lead whites to have more relationships with blacks as adults. While we do not find impacts on labor market outcomes, there are significant effects on reported racial attitudes. Furthermore, an increa…
The Long Run Impact of Childhood Interracial Contact on Residential Segregation
Open AccessLuca Merlino, Max Friedrich Steinhardt et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2022
Decentralization, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Public Services
Open AccessCamille Hémet, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.PREPRINTSSRN Electronic Journal2023
The Impact of Childhood Inter-Ethnic Contact on Managers' Hiring Decisions
Open AccessLiam Wren‐Lewis, Liam Wren-Lewis et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2024
Complementarities in Infrastructure
Open AccessOliver Vanden Eynde, Liam Wren‐Lewis et al.ARTICLEThe World Bank Economic Review2025
Complementarities between infrastructure projects have been understudied. Using temporal variation in the independent rollout of large-scale road construction and electrification programs in rural India, this study estimates their individual and joint impacts on a range of outcomes. Notably, there is strong evidence that villages increase dry-season cropping when they receive both electricity and roads, but not when they receive one without the o…