Jack S Russell
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 93460 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jack S Russell |
| NOMBRES | Jack S |
| APELLIDO | Russell |
| FIRMA | RUSSELL J S |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Southern California |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3135-8120 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 31 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 16 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1980 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Paradoxes of infinite aggregation
There are infinitely many ways the world might be, and there may well be infinitely many people in it. These facts raise moral paradoxes. We explore a conflict between two highly attractive principles: a Pareto principle that says that what is better for everyone is better overall, and a statewise dominance principle that says that what is sure to turn out better is better on balance. We refine and generalize this paradox, showing that the proble…
The Value of Normative Information
This paper explores the idea that it is instrumentally valuable to learn normative truths. We consider an argument for ‘normative hedging’ based on this principle, and examine the structure of decision-making under moral uncertainty that arises from it. But it also turns out that the value of normative information is inconsistent with the principle that learning empirical truths is instrumentally valuable. Along the way, we develop a unified fram…
On two arguments for fanaticism
Should we make significant sacrifices to ever‐so‐slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever‐so‐slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I evaluate the prospects for Fanaticism, in connection with two other kinds of ge…
Counting Your Chickens
Suppose that, for reasons of animal welfare, it would be better if everyone stopped eating chicken. Does it follow that you should stop eating chicken? Proponents of the ‘inefficacy objection’ argue that, due to the scale and complexity of markets, the expected effects of your chicken purchases are negligible. So the expected effects of eating chicken do not make it wrong.We argue that this objection does not succeed, in two steps. First, empiric…
Updating without evidence
Sometimes you are unreliable at fulfilling your doxastic plans: for example, if you plan to be fully confident in all truths, probably you will end up being fully confident in some falsehoods by mistake. In some cases, there is information that plays the classical role of evidence —your beliefs are perfectly discriminating with respect to some possible facts about the world—and there is a standard expected‐accuracy‐based justification for plannin…
Fixing Stochastic Dominance
Decision theorists widely accept a stochastic dominance principle: roughly, if a risky prospect A is at least as probable as another prospect B to result in something at least as good, then A is at least as good as B. Recently, philosophers have applied this principle even in contexts where the values of possible outcomes do not have the structure of the real numbers: this includes cases of incommensurable values and cases of infinite values. But…
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence
Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idea…
On the Probability of Plenitude
I examine what the mathematical theory of random structures can teach us about the probability of Plenitude, a thesis closely related to David Lewis's modal realism. Given some natural assumptions, Plenitude is reasonably probable a priori, but in principle it can be (and plausibly it has been) empirically disconfirmed—not by any general qualitative evidence, but rather by our de re evidence
Infinite Prospects
People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic—but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the Countable Sure Thing Principle , as well as an infinitary ge…
The Logic of Opacity
We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher‐order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it …
Qualitative Grounds
General Dynamic Triviality Theorems
Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domai…
On Where Things Could Be
Some philosophers respond to Leibniz’s “shift” argument against absolute space by appealing to antihaecceitism about possible worlds, using David Lewis’s counterpart theory. But separated from Lewis’s distinctive system, it is difficult to understand what this doctrine amounts to or how it bears on the Leibnizian argument. In fact, the best way of making sense of the relevant kind of antihaecceitism concedes the main point of the Leibnizian argum…
Possible Worlds and the Objective World
Protest, Politics, and Prosperity
Journal Article Protest, Politics, and Prosperity: Black Americans and White Institutions, 1940–75. By Dorothy K. Newman, Nancy J. Amidei, Barbara L. Carter, Dawn Day, William J. Kruvant, and Jack S. Russell. (New York: Pantheon, 1978. xix + 348 pp. Charts, tables, notes, bibliographical note, and index. $15.95.) Get access David M. Katzman David M. Katzman University of Kansas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scho…
Protest, Politics, and Prosperity
Possible Worlds and the Objective World
Infinite Prospects
People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic—but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the Countable Sure Thing Principle , as well as an infinitary ge…
The Logic of Opacity
We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher‐order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it …
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence
Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idea…
On Where Things Could Be
Some philosophers respond to Leibniz’s “shift” argument against absolute space by appealing to antihaecceitism about possible worlds, using David Lewis’s counterpart theory. But separated from Lewis’s distinctive system, it is difficult to understand what this doctrine amounts to or how it bears on the Leibnizian argument. In fact, the best way of making sense of the relevant kind of antihaecceitism concedes the main point of the Leibnizian argum…
Fixing Stochastic Dominance
Decision theorists widely accept a stochastic dominance principle: roughly, if a risky prospect A is at least as probable as another prospect B to result in something at least as good, then A is at least as good as B. Recently, philosophers have applied this principle even in contexts where the values of possible outcomes do not have the structure of the real numbers: this includes cases of incommensurable values and cases of infinite values. But…
General Dynamic Triviality Theorems
Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domai…
Qualitative Grounds
Protest, Politics, and Prosperity
Journal Article Protest, Politics, and Prosperity: Black Americans and White Institutions, 1940–75. By Dorothy K. Newman, Nancy J. Amidei, Barbara L. Carter, Dawn Day, William J. Kruvant, and Jack S. Russell. (New York: Pantheon, 1978. xix + 348 pp. Charts, tables, notes, bibliographical note, and index. $15.95.) Get access David M. Katzman David M. Katzman University of Kansas Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scho…
Protest, Politics, and Prosperity
Possible Worlds and the Objective World
On Where Things Could Be
Some philosophers respond to Leibniz’s “shift” argument against absolute space by appealing to antihaecceitism about possible worlds, using David Lewis’s counterpart theory. But separated from Lewis’s distinctive system, it is difficult to understand what this doctrine amounts to or how it bears on the Leibnizian argument. In fact, the best way of making sense of the relevant kind of antihaecceitism concedes the main point of the Leibnizian argum…
Qualitative Grounds
General Dynamic Triviality Theorems
Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domai…
The Logic of Opacity
We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher‐order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it …
On the Probability of Plenitude
I examine what the mathematical theory of random structures can teach us about the probability of Plenitude, a thesis closely related to David Lewis's modal realism. Given some natural assumptions, Plenitude is reasonably probable a priori, but in principle it can be (and plausibly it has been) empirically disconfirmed—not by any general qualitative evidence, but rather by our de re evidence
Infinite Prospects
People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic—but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the Countable Sure Thing Principle , as well as an infinitary ge…
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence
Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idea…
Updating without evidence
Sometimes you are unreliable at fulfilling your doxastic plans: for example, if you plan to be fully confident in all truths, probably you will end up being fully confident in some falsehoods by mistake. In some cases, there is information that plays the classical role of evidence —your beliefs are perfectly discriminating with respect to some possible facts about the world—and there is a standard expected‐accuracy‐based justification for plannin…
Fixing Stochastic Dominance
Decision theorists widely accept a stochastic dominance principle: roughly, if a risky prospect A is at least as probable as another prospect B to result in something at least as good, then A is at least as good as B. Recently, philosophers have applied this principle even in contexts where the values of possible outcomes do not have the structure of the real numbers: this includes cases of incommensurable values and cases of infinite values. But…
On two arguments for fanaticism
Should we make significant sacrifices to ever‐so‐slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever‐so‐slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? Fanaticism says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I evaluate the prospects for Fanaticism, in connection with two other kinds of ge…
Counting Your Chickens
Suppose that, for reasons of animal welfare, it would be better if everyone stopped eating chicken. Does it follow that you should stop eating chicken? Proponents of the ‘inefficacy objection’ argue that, due to the scale and complexity of markets, the expected effects of your chicken purchases are negligible. So the expected effects of eating chicken do not make it wrong.We argue that this objection does not succeed, in two steps. First, empiric…
Paradoxes of infinite aggregation
There are infinitely many ways the world might be, and there may well be infinitely many people in it. These facts raise moral paradoxes. We explore a conflict between two highly attractive principles: a Pareto principle that says that what is better for everyone is better overall, and a statewise dominance principle that says that what is sure to turn out better is better on balance. We refine and generalize this paradox, showing that the proble…
The Value of Normative Information
This paper explores the idea that it is instrumentally valuable to learn normative truths. We consider an argument for ‘normative hedging’ based on this principle, and examine the structure of decision-making under moral uncertainty that arises from it. But it also turns out that the value of normative information is inconsistent with the principle that learning empirical truths is instrumentally valuable. Along the way, we develop a unified fram…
Philosophy (12 obras) · Epistemology (11 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 obras) · Mathematics (5 obras) · Economics (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Linguistics (4 obras)