Adrien Doerig
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 943838 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Adrien Doerig |
| NOMBRES | Adrien |
| APELLIDO | Doerig |
| FIRMA | DOERIG A |
| AFILIACIONES | Osnabrück University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5120-9750 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 5 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 0 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2019 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
End-to-end topographic networks as models of cortical map formation and human visual behaviour
A prominent feature of the primate visual system is its topographic organization. For understanding its origins, its computational role and its behavioural implications, computational models are of central importance. Yet, vision is commonly modelled using convolutional neural networks, which are hard-wired to learn identical features across space and thus lack topography. Here we overcome this limitation by introducing all-topographic neural net…
Why computational complexity may set impenetrable barriers for epistemic reductionism
According to physicalism, everything is physical or metaphysically connected to the physical. If physicalism were true, it seems that we should – in principle – be able to reduce the descriptions and explanations of special sciences to physical ones, for example, explaining biological regularities, via chemistry, by the laws of particle physics. The multiple realization of the property types of the special sciences is often seen to be an obstacle…
A new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness
Local theories of consciousness state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas, given some background conditions. We challenge the core prediction of local theories based on long‐lasting postdictive effects demonstrating that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived. Unlike previous empirical data aimed against lo…
First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether first-person experience, independent of third-person data, is a sufficient foundation for theories of consciousness. Here, we argue th…
The unfolding argument
How can we explain consciousness? This question has become a vibrant topic of neuroscience research in recent decades. A large body of empirical results has been accumulated, and many theories have been proposed. Certain theories suggest that consciousness should be explained in terms of brain functions, such as accessing information in a global workspace, applying higher order to lower order representations, or predictive coding. These functions…
Sin obras prominentes en esta página.
The unfolding argument
How can we explain consciousness? This question has become a vibrant topic of neuroscience research in recent decades. A large body of empirical results has been accumulated, and many theories have been proposed. Certain theories suggest that consciousness should be explained in terms of brain functions, such as accessing information in a global workspace, applying higher order to lower order representations, or predictive coding. These functions…
A new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness
Local theories of consciousness state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas, given some background conditions. We challenge the core prediction of local theories based on long‐lasting postdictive effects demonstrating that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived. Unlike previous empirical data aimed against lo…
First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether first-person experience, independent of third-person data, is a sufficient foundation for theories of consciousness. Here, we argue th…
Why computational complexity may set impenetrable barriers for epistemic reductionism
According to physicalism, everything is physical or metaphysically connected to the physical. If physicalism were true, it seems that we should – in principle – be able to reduce the descriptions and explanations of special sciences to physical ones, for example, explaining biological regularities, via chemistry, by the laws of particle physics. The multiple realization of the property types of the special sciences is often seen to be an obstacle…
End-to-end topographic networks as models of cortical map formation and human visual behaviour
A prominent feature of the primate visual system is its topographic organization. For understanding its origins, its computational role and its behavioural implications, computational models are of central importance. Yet, vision is commonly modelled using convolutional neural networks, which are hard-wired to learn identical features across space and thus lack topography. Here we overcome this limitation by introducing all-topographic neural net…
Consciousness (3 obras) · Electromagnetic theories of consciousness (3 obras) · Epistemology (3 obras) · Neuroscience (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (2 obras) · Causal structure (2 obras) · Cognitive psychology (2 obras) · Cognitive science (2 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras)