Markos Valaris
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 955167 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Markos Valaris |
| NOMBRES | Markos |
| APELLIDO | Valaris |
| FIRMA | VALARIS M |
| AFILIACIONES | UNSW Sydney |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7254-3253 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2015 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Knowledge and agential control
Agential control has, with good reason, emerged as an important topic in the philosophy of action. This paper considers what reflection on control can tell us about some fundamental assumptions in the philosophy of action, and specifically about the role of the mind in action. I begin by arguing that some currently popular accounts of control (in terms either of the reliable execution of intentions, or of guidance by states of knowledge-how fail)…
The Shape of Agency
"The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), p. 1
Reason in Nature
Normality, safety and knowledge
Recent epistemology has seen a striking rise in interest in the notion of normality , including in the analysis of justified belief, defeasible reasoning, and knowledge. In the analysis of knowledge in particular, normality has been used to support modal analyses of knowledge, according to which knowledge is safely true belief. In this paper, I sound a note of caution regarding this proposal. As I will argue, the counterexamples that originally s…
Knowledge Out of Control
According to a thesis famously associated with Anscombe'sIntention, knowledge is a necessary condition of intentional action: when acting intentionally, we know what we are doing. Call this the Agential Knowledge thesis. The Agential Knowledge thesis remains, of course, controversial. Furthermore, as even some of its proponents acknowledge, it can appear puzzling: Why should acting intentionally require knowing what you are doing? My aim in this …
Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy
Knowing what you are doing
Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully‐fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. …
Thinking by doing
What reasoning might be
Attention and Synthesis in Kant's Conception of Experience
In an intriguing but neglected passage in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant appears to link the synthetic activity of the understanding in experience with the phenomenon of attention (B156-7n). In this paper we take up this hint, and draw upon Kant’s remarks about attention in the Anthropology to shed light on the vexed question of what, exactly, the understanding’s role in experience is for Kant. We argue that reading Kant’s claims about synthe…
The Instrumental Structure of Actions
Journal Article The Instrumental Structure of Actions Get access Markos Valaris Markos Valaris University of New South Wales, Australia E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 65, Issue 258, January 2015, Pages 64–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu054 Published: 28 August 2014
Attention and Synthesis in Kant's Conception of Experience
In an intriguing but neglected passage in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant appears to link the synthetic activity of the understanding in experience with the phenomenon of attention (B156-7n). In this paper we take up this hint, and draw upon Kant’s remarks about attention in the Anthropology to shed light on the vexed question of what, exactly, the understanding’s role in experience is for Kant. We argue that reading Kant’s claims about synthe…
What reasoning might be
Knowledge Out of Control
According to a thesis famously associated with Anscombe'sIntention, knowledge is a necessary condition of intentional action: when acting intentionally, we know what we are doing. Call this the Agential Knowledge thesis. The Agential Knowledge thesis remains, of course, controversial. Furthermore, as even some of its proponents acknowledge, it can appear puzzling: Why should acting intentionally require knowing what you are doing? My aim in this …
The Instrumental Structure of Actions
Journal Article The Instrumental Structure of Actions Get access Markos Valaris Markos Valaris University of New South Wales, Australia E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 65, Issue 258, January 2015, Pages 64–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu054 Published: 28 August 2014
The Instrumental Structure of Actions
Journal Article The Instrumental Structure of Actions Get access Markos Valaris Markos Valaris University of New South Wales, Australia E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 65, Issue 258, January 2015, Pages 64–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu054 Published: 28 August 2014
What reasoning might be
Attention and Synthesis in Kant's Conception of Experience
In an intriguing but neglected passage in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant appears to link the synthetic activity of the understanding in experience with the phenomenon of attention (B156-7n). In this paper we take up this hint, and draw upon Kant’s remarks about attention in the Anthropology to shed light on the vexed question of what, exactly, the understanding’s role in experience is for Kant. We argue that reading Kant’s claims about synthe…
Knowing what you are doing
Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully‐fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. …
Thinking by doing
Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy
Reason in Nature
Normality, safety and knowledge
Recent epistemology has seen a striking rise in interest in the notion of normality , including in the analysis of justified belief, defeasible reasoning, and knowledge. In the analysis of knowledge in particular, normality has been used to support modal analyses of knowledge, according to which knowledge is safely true belief. In this paper, I sound a note of caution regarding this proposal. As I will argue, the counterexamples that originally s…
Knowledge Out of Control
According to a thesis famously associated with Anscombe'sIntention, knowledge is a necessary condition of intentional action: when acting intentionally, we know what we are doing. Call this the Agential Knowledge thesis. The Agential Knowledge thesis remains, of course, controversial. Furthermore, as even some of its proponents acknowledge, it can appear puzzling: Why should acting intentionally require knowing what you are doing? My aim in this …
The Shape of Agency
"The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), p. 1
Knowledge and agential control
Agential control has, with good reason, emerged as an important topic in the philosophy of action. This paper considers what reflection on control can tell us about some fundamental assumptions in the philosophy of action, and specifically about the role of the mind in action. I begin by arguing that some currently popular accounts of control (in terms either of the reliable execution of intentions, or of guidance by states of knowledge-how fail)…
Philosophy (8 obras) · Epistemology (7 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Action (physics) (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (3 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (3 obras) · Cognitive science (3 obras)