Lars Freund
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 9559789 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Lars Freund |
| NOMBRES | Lars |
| APELLIDO | Freund |
| FIRMA | FREUND L |
| AFILIACIONES | Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 2 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 0 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 2 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2017 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
Behaviorally efficient remedies
Under common law, the standard remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages. Under continental law, the standard is specific performance. The common law solution is ex post efficient. But is it also ex ante efficient? We use experimental methods to test whether knowing that non-fulfilment will only give a right to damages deters mutually beneficial trade. The design excludes aversion against others willfully breaking their promises, and f…
The Moral-Hazard Effect of Liquidated Damages
Recent evidence suggests that liquidated-damages clauses provide efficiency advantages by crowding out contracting parties' deontological concerns about efficient breach. In this paper we highlight an important downside to damage stipulations by parties. Based on findings obtained in a controlled laboratory experiment, we suggest that express damage stipulations trigger negative reciprocity and moral hazard, reducing performance by contract promi…
Sin obras prominentes en esta página.
The Moral-Hazard Effect of Liquidated Damages
Recent evidence suggests that liquidated-damages clauses provide efficiency advantages by crowding out contracting parties' deontological concerns about efficient breach. In this paper we highlight an important downside to damage stipulations by parties. Based on findings obtained in a controlled laboratory experiment, we suggest that express damage stipulations trigger negative reciprocity and moral hazard, reducing performance by contract promi…
Behaviorally efficient remedies
Under common law, the standard remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages. Under continental law, the standard is specific performance. The common law solution is ex post efficient. But is it also ex ante efficient? We use experimental methods to test whether knowing that non-fulfilment will only give a right to damages deters mutually beneficial trade. The design excludes aversion against others willfully breaking their promises, and f…
Business (2 obras) · Damages (2 obras) · Economics (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 obras) · Microeconomics (2 obras) · Political science (2 obras) · Breach of contract (1 obra) · Commodity (1 obra) · Corruption and Economic Development (1 obra)