James W Cornman
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 957359 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | James W Cornman |
| NOMBRES | James W |
| APELLIDO | Cornman |
| FIRMA | CORNMAN J W |
| AFILIACIONES | California University of Pennsylvania |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 15 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1962 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1982 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation
Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation
1 An Argument for the Explanatory Foundational Theory and Against Skepticism.- I: Skepticism and the Foundations of Justification.- 2 Skepticism and a Foundation of Certainty.- 3 Skepticism and Acceptability without Certainty.- 4 Skepticism and the Probability of Nonbasic Statements (I): On Sufficient Conditions for Absolute Probabilities.- 5 Skepticism and the Probability of Nonbasic Statements (II): On Sufficient Conditions for Conditional Prob…
Perception, Common Sense, and Science
Materialism and Sensations
Materialism and Sensations
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Materialism and Sensations. By James W. Coenman. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1971. Pp. xiv + 352. Price £4.75) Les Holborow Les Holborow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 91, April 1973, Pages 178–180, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217498 Published: 01 April 1973
Craig's theorem, Ramsey-sentences, and scientific instrumentalism
Observing and What it Entails
In the preceding article, [3], Peter Machamer states three objections to my recent attempt to define ‘observation term’. While I believe that all Machamer's objections are mistaken, as I will try to show, his discussion does touch on two problems which have forced revisions. Both his first and second objections are that my definition is too restrictive because its second necessary condition for a term ‘O‘ being an observation term rules out too m…
Philosophical Problems and Arguments
Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism
Some materialists argue that we can eliminate mental entities such as sensations because, like electrons, they are theoretical entities postulated as parts of scientific explanations, but, unlike electrons, they are unnecessary for such explanations. As Quine says, any explanatory role of mental entities can be played by “correlative physiological states and events instead.” But sensations are not postulated theoretical entities. This is shown by…
Metaphysics, Reference, and Language
Metaphysics, Reference, and Language
Book Reviews Get access Metaphysics, Reference, and Language. By James W. Cornman. (New Haven & London : Yale University Press. 1966. Pp. xxi + 288. Price $7.50 or 56s). J. E. Llewelyn J. E. Llewelyn Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 17, Issue 68, July 1967, Pages 276–277, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218172 Published: 01 July 1967
Strawson's “Person”
The Extent of Intentionality
Journal Article The Extent of Intentionality Get access James W. Cornman James W. Cornman University of Rochester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue 57, October 1964, Pages 355–357, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217775 Published: 01 October 1964
Intentionality and Intensionality
Intentionality and Intensionality Get access James W. Cornman James W. Cornman The Ohio State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 12, Issue 46, January 1962, Pages 44–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2216838 Published: 01 January 1962
Craig's theorem, Ramsey-sentences, and scientific instrumentalism
Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism
Some materialists argue that we can eliminate mental entities such as sensations because, like electrons, they are theoretical entities postulated as parts of scientific explanations, but, unlike electrons, they are unnecessary for such explanations. As Quine says, any explanatory role of mental entities can be played by “correlative physiological states and events instead.” But sensations are not postulated theoretical entities. This is shown by…
Observing and What it Entails
In the preceding article, [3], Peter Machamer states three objections to my recent attempt to define ‘observation term’. While I believe that all Machamer's objections are mistaken, as I will try to show, his discussion does touch on two problems which have forced revisions. Both his first and second objections are that my definition is too restrictive because its second necessary condition for a term ‘O‘ being an observation term rules out too m…
Intentionality and Intensionality
Intentionality and Intensionality Get access James W. Cornman James W. Cornman The Ohio State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 12, Issue 46, January 1962, Pages 44–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2216838 Published: 01 January 1962
Intentionality and Intensionality
Intentionality and Intensionality Get access James W. Cornman James W. Cornman The Ohio State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 12, Issue 46, January 1962, Pages 44–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2216838 Published: 01 January 1962
Strawson's “Person”
The Extent of Intentionality
Journal Article The Extent of Intentionality Get access James W. Cornman James W. Cornman University of Rochester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue 57, October 1964, Pages 355–357, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217775 Published: 01 October 1964
Metaphysics, Reference, and Language
Book Reviews Get access Metaphysics, Reference, and Language. By James W. Cornman. (New Haven & London : Yale University Press. 1966. Pp. xxi + 288. Price $7.50 or 56s). J. E. Llewelyn J. E. Llewelyn Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 17, Issue 68, July 1967, Pages 276–277, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218172 Published: 01 July 1967
Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism
Some materialists argue that we can eliminate mental entities such as sensations because, like electrons, they are theoretical entities postulated as parts of scientific explanations, but, unlike electrons, they are unnecessary for such explanations. As Quine says, any explanatory role of mental entities can be played by “correlative physiological states and events instead.” But sensations are not postulated theoretical entities. This is shown by…
Metaphysics, Reference, and Language
Philosophical Problems and Arguments
Observing and What it Entails
In the preceding article, [3], Peter Machamer states three objections to my recent attempt to define ‘observation term’. While I believe that all Machamer's objections are mistaken, as I will try to show, his discussion does touch on two problems which have forced revisions. Both his first and second objections are that my definition is too restrictive because its second necessary condition for a term ‘O‘ being an observation term rules out too m…
Craig's theorem, Ramsey-sentences, and scientific instrumentalism
Materialism and Sensations
Materialism and Sensations
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Materialism and Sensations. By James W. Coenman. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1971. Pp. xiv + 352. Price £4.75) Les Holborow Les Holborow Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 23, Issue 91, April 1973, Pages 178–180, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217498 Published: 01 April 1973
Perception, Common Sense, and Science
Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation
Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation
1 An Argument for the Explanatory Foundational Theory and Against Skepticism.- I: Skepticism and the Foundations of Justification.- 2 Skepticism and a Foundation of Certainty.- 3 Skepticism and Acceptability without Certainty.- 4 Skepticism and the Probability of Nonbasic Statements (I): On Sufficient Conditions for Absolute Probabilities.- 5 Skepticism and the Probability of Nonbasic Statements (II): On Sufficient Conditions for Conditional Prob…
Philosophy (14 obras) · Epistemology (12 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (5 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Psychology (5 obras) · Analytic philosophy (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 obras) · Classics (3 obras)