Umut Baysan
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 959792 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Umut Baysan |
| NOMBRES | Umut |
| APELLIDO | Baysan |
| FIRMA | BAYSAN U |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Oxford |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2016 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Does Panpsychism Explain Mental Causation
In the contemporary literature on panpsychism, one often finds the claim that a Russellian-monist version of panpsychism, i.e., Russellian panpsychism , is a superior view compared to alternative non-physicalist theories. The argument for this claim is that while Russellian panpsychism can integrate consciousness in the causal order and explain mental causation, alternative theories fail to do so. If this is correct, panpsychism deserves its plac…
Emergent moral non‐naturalism
This paper introduces emergent moral non‐naturalism , which holds that moral properties depend on descriptive properties and normative bridge principles for their instantiation, where these principles specify instantiation conditions of moral properties in terms of descriptive properties. Continuous with the non‐naturalist tradition in metaethics, this view takes moral properties to be noncausal properties; in accordance with the emergentist trad…
Physicalism or Anti-physicalism
In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By ap…
Social constructs and how not to ground them
According to a current trend in social ontology, by articulating claims of social construction in terms of metaphysical grounding, we can shed light on the metaphysics of social construction and understand deep truths about social identities like race and gender. Focusing on two recent accounts, I argue that this move from social construction to grounding has limitations. While there are intelligible grounding claims that can explain certain idea…
Arguing About Moral Causation
Here is an influential argument for naturalism: moral properties play causal roles in the natural world, and only naturalism can explain this phenomenon of “moral causation”. Here, I show that this argument from moral causation cannot be maintained. More specifically, the argument relies on the premise that only natural properties can play causal roles in the natural world, but based on the existing dialectic, the most likely way of defending tha…
Truthmaker puzzles for one-level physicalists
According to one-level physicalism, reality is exhausted by fundamental physical entities and properties. This position is sometimes defended on the basis of the truthmaker view of ontological commitment. Accordingly, physicalists can affirm higher-level truths without ontologically committing to any higher-level properties or states of affairs; fundamental physical states of affairs serve as truthmakers of all truths that have truthmakers, and a…
Metaphysical Emergence
In this much-anticipated book, Jessica Wilson shows that there is ‘prima facie support for thinking that broadly natural entities are cotemporally materially dependent on micro-configurations of fundamental physical entities, yet are also ontologically and causally autonomous with respect to these underlying micro-configurations. And that is just to say that, on the face of it, there is metaphysical emergence.’ (pp. 6–7, emphases in the original)…
Rejecting epiphobia
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and th…
Non-standard approaches to emergence
Mad Qualia
This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is (nomologically) possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with…
Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World
Jaegwon Kim's contributions to philosophy of mind have focused on trying to find a place for mental phenomena in the causal order of events in the physical world. For decades, he has argued that mental properties can't be causally efficacious unless they are somehow reducible to physical properties—given the hypothesis that the physical world is causally closed. On this point, he has been an opponent of non-reductive physicalism (NRP), which acce…
An Argument for Power Inheritance
Non-reductive physicalism is commonly understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. Here, I argue that the realization relation in question is a power inheritance relation: if a property P realizes a property Q, then the causal powers of Q are a subset of the causal powers of P. Whereas others have motivated this claim by appealing to its theoretical benefits, I argue that it is in fact entailed by two theses:…
An Argument for Power Inheritance
Non-reductive physicalism is commonly understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. Here, I argue that the realization relation in question is a power inheritance relation: if a property P realizes a property Q, then the causal powers of Q are a subset of the causal powers of P. Whereas others have motivated this claim by appealing to its theoretical benefits, I argue that it is in fact entailed by two theses:…
Rejecting epiphobia
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and th…
Mad Qualia
This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is (nomologically) possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with…
Non-standard approaches to emergence
Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World
Jaegwon Kim's contributions to philosophy of mind have focused on trying to find a place for mental phenomena in the causal order of events in the physical world. For decades, he has argued that mental properties can't be causally efficacious unless they are somehow reducible to physical properties—given the hypothesis that the physical world is causally closed. On this point, he has been an opponent of non-reductive physicalism (NRP), which acce…
An Argument for Power Inheritance
Non-reductive physicalism is commonly understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. Here, I argue that the realization relation in question is a power inheritance relation: if a property P realizes a property Q, then the causal powers of Q are a subset of the causal powers of P. Whereas others have motivated this claim by appealing to its theoretical benefits, I argue that it is in fact entailed by two theses:…
Mad Qualia
This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e., the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case it is (nomologically) possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different causal powers. This is done with…
Rejecting epiphobia
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and th…
Non-standard approaches to emergence
Truthmaker puzzles for one-level physicalists
According to one-level physicalism, reality is exhausted by fundamental physical entities and properties. This position is sometimes defended on the basis of the truthmaker view of ontological commitment. Accordingly, physicalists can affirm higher-level truths without ontologically committing to any higher-level properties or states of affairs; fundamental physical states of affairs serve as truthmakers of all truths that have truthmakers, and a…
Metaphysical Emergence
In this much-anticipated book, Jessica Wilson shows that there is ‘prima facie support for thinking that broadly natural entities are cotemporally materially dependent on micro-configurations of fundamental physical entities, yet are also ontologically and causally autonomous with respect to these underlying micro-configurations. And that is just to say that, on the face of it, there is metaphysical emergence.’ (pp. 6–7, emphases in the original)…
Physicalism or Anti-physicalism
In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By ap…
Social constructs and how not to ground them
According to a current trend in social ontology, by articulating claims of social construction in terms of metaphysical grounding, we can shed light on the metaphysics of social construction and understand deep truths about social identities like race and gender. Focusing on two recent accounts, I argue that this move from social construction to grounding has limitations. While there are intelligible grounding claims that can explain certain idea…
Arguing About Moral Causation
Here is an influential argument for naturalism: moral properties play causal roles in the natural world, and only naturalism can explain this phenomenon of “moral causation”. Here, I show that this argument from moral causation cannot be maintained. More specifically, the argument relies on the premise that only natural properties can play causal roles in the natural world, but based on the existing dialectic, the most likely way of defending tha…
Does Panpsychism Explain Mental Causation
In the contemporary literature on panpsychism, one often finds the claim that a Russellian-monist version of panpsychism, i.e., Russellian panpsychism , is a superior view compared to alternative non-physicalist theories. The argument for this claim is that while Russellian panpsychism can integrate consciousness in the causal order and explain mental causation, alternative theories fail to do so. If this is correct, panpsychism deserves its plac…
Emergent moral non‐naturalism
This paper introduces emergent moral non‐naturalism , which holds that moral properties depend on descriptive properties and normative bridge principles for their instantiation, where these principles specify instantiation conditions of moral properties in terms of descriptive properties. Continuous with the non‐naturalist tradition in metaethics, this view takes moral properties to be noncausal properties; in accordance with the emergentist trad…
Epistemology (12 obras) · Philosophy (12 obras) · Metaphysics (9 obras) · Ontology (6 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 obras) · Physicalism (5 obras) · Causation (4 obras) · Consciousness (4 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 obras)