Gerhard Schurz
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 960735 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Gerhard Schurz |
| NOMBRES | Gerhard |
| APELLIDO | Schurz |
| FIRMA | SCHURZ G |
| AFILIACIONES | Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4107-9240 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 48 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 175 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 45 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 3 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1994 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 8 |
Discussion Note
This note offers a response to Bakshi’s critical discussion of Schurz’s claim that meta-induction provides a non-circular justification of object-induction (induction at the object-level of events). Bakshi raises two issues: 1. The problem of identifying object-inductive methods, and 2. the problem of determining the pool of simultaneously accessible prediction methods. In this reply, a solution to the identification problem is offered, based on …
Theories of Causality in Analytic Philosophy
This article provides an overview and critical discussion of major approaches to causality in contemporary analytic philosophy, with a focus on their relevance to the social sciences. After a discussion of regularity accounts of causality in the spirit of logical empiricism (Sections 2–3), four important groups of more recent postpositivist approaches are examined: counterfactual accounts of causality within the metaphysical framework of similari…
Meta-inductive Justification of Inductive Generalizations
The account of meta-induction (G. Schurz, Hume’s problem solved: the optimality of meta-induction, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2019) proposes a two-step solution to the problem of induction. Step 1 consists in a mathematical a priori justification of the predictive optimality of meta-induction, upon which step 2 builds a meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction based on its superior track record (Sect. 1). Sterkenburg (Br J Philos …
Relevance as difference-making
In this paper a generalized account of relevance as difference-making is developed. It is argued that relevance should not be considered as a particular relation, but as a (higher-order) property of instances of arbitrary relations: namely the property that variations of the relata of the relation instance make a difference for its truth. This generalized account of relevance can be fruitfully applied in many domains, such as (i) logical reasonin…
Henderson on Meta-Induction and the Problem of Induction
This note presents a short reply to Henderson’s critical discussion of Schurz’s approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise—namely, an approximation condition—that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson’s approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed …
In Search for Optimal Methods
In this paper, the contributions to the account of meta-induction (Schurz 2019) collected in this volume are critically discussed and thereby, new insights are developed. How broad and expandable the program of meta-induction is can be learned from Ortner’s contribution. New insights about the transition from the a priori justification of meta-induction to the a posteriori justification of object-induction emerge from the reflection of Shogenji’s…
Meta-Inductive Probability Aggregation
There is a plurality of formal constraints for aggregating probabilities of a group of individuals. Different constraints characterise different families of aggregation rules. In this paper, we focus on the families of linear and geometric opinion pooling rules which consist in linear, respectively, geometric weighted averaging of the individuals’ probabilities. For these families, it is debated which weights exactly are to be chosen. By applying…
Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective
Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise as well as to an agent’s ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this paper we employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism t…
Optimality justifications and the optimality principle
The background of this paper (section 1) consists in a new account to foundation‐theoretic epistemology characterized by two features: (i) All beliefs are to be justified by deductive, inductive or abductive inferences from a minimalistic class of unproblematic (introspective or analytic) basic beliefs. (ii) Higher‐order justifications for these inferences are given by means of the novel method of optimality justifications. Optimality justificati…
The Impact of Meta-Induction
In the first section, five major attempts to solve the problem of induction and their failures are discussed. In the second section, an account of meta-induction is introduced. It offers a novel solution to the problem of induction, based on mathematical theorems about the predictive optimality of attractivity-weighted meta-induction. In the third section, how the a priori justification of meta-induction provides a non-circular a posteriori justi…
Alternative Possibilities and the Meaning of 'Can'
Our account of free will integrates a counterfactual conditional analysis of abilities with a Frankfurt-style sourcehood psychological approach and is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. It effectively addresses criticisms of the conditional analysis of “can” by demanding coherence between agents’ free actions and their personality frames. The paper begins by discussing conditional analyses of abilities, followed by an exploration…
Metainduction over Unboundedly Many Prediction Methods
The universal optimality theorem for metainduction works for epistemic agents faced with a choice among finitely many prediction methods. Eckhart Arnold and Tom Sterkenburg objected that it breaks down for infinite or unboundedly growing sets of methods. In this article the metainductive approach is defended against this challenge by extending the optimality theorem (i) to unboundedly growing sets of methods whose number grows less than exponenti…
Why classical logic is privileged
In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies…
Reichenbach's best alternative account to the problem of induction
In this paper Reichenbach's best alternative account (BAA) to induction is examined. In the first section, three versions of the BAA are distinguished that have been discussed in the literature. The major objections against all three versions are presented. In the second section it is shown by a text analysis that Reichenbach (The theory of probability, University of California Press, California, 1949) argues for all three versions of the BAA and…
Probabilistic truthlikeness, content elements, and meta-inductive probability optimization
The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness (Sects. 1, 2). In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures (t-measures) are introduced: (i) comparative versus numeric t-measures, (ii) t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and (iii) t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthli…
Twelve great papers
The material theory of object-induction and the universal optimality of meta-induction
Genuine Confirmation and Tacking by Conjunction
Tacking by conjunction is a deep problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. It is based on the insight that to each hypothesis h that is confirmed by a piece of evidence e one can ‘tack’ an irrelevant hypothesis h′ so that h∧h′ is also confirmed by e. This seems counter-intuitive. Existing Bayesian solution proposals try to soften the negative impact of this result by showing that although h∧h′ is confirmed by e, it is so only to a lower degree. I…
Hume's Problem Solved
A new approach to Hume's problem of induction that justifies the optimality of induction at the level of meta-induction. Hume's problem of justifying induction has been among epistemology's greatest challenges for centuries. In this book, Gerhard Schurz proposes a new approach to Hume's problem. Acknowledging the force of Hume's arguments against the possibility of a noncircular justification of the reliability of induction, Schurz demonstrates i…
Philosophy of Science
Optimality justifications
Epsa15 Selected Papers
Interactive Causes
This article suggests a revision of the theory of causal nets (TCN). In section 1 we introduce an axiomatization of TCN based on a realistic understanding. It is shown that the causal Markov condition entails three independent principles. In section 2 we analyze indeterministic decay as the major counterexample to one of these principles: screening off by common causes (SCC). We call SCC-violating common causes interactive causes. In section 3 we…
No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of Meta-induction
The no free lunch theorem is a radicalized version of Hume’s induction skepticism. It asserts that relative to a uniform probability distribution over all possible worlds, all computable prediction algorithms—whether ‘clever’ inductive or ‘stupid’ guessing methods (etc.)—have the same expected predictive success. This theorem seems to be in conflict with results about meta-induction. According to these results, certain meta-inductive prediction s…
Introduction to the special issue “Causation, probability, and truth—the philosophy of Clark Glymour”
Patterns of abduction
The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game
This article suggests a ‘best alternative’ justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction meth…
Outline of a theory of scientific understanding
Causality as a theoretical concept
Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem holds for possible-world-accounts but not for consequence-accounts to verisimilitude
Explanation as Unification
When Empirical Success Implies Theoretical Reference
Starting from a brief recapitulation of the contemporary debate on scientific realism, this paper argues for the following thesis: Assume a theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of application A, but was superseded later on by a superior theory T*, which was likewise successful in A but has an arbitrarily different theoretical superstructure. Then under natural conditions T contains certain theoretical expressions, which yielded T'…
What is ‘Normal‘? An Evolution-Theoretic Foundation for Normic Laws and Their Relation to Statistical Normality
Normic laws have the form “if A, then normally B.” They are omnipresent in everyday life and non-physical ‘life’ sciences such as biology, psychology, social sciences, and humanities. They differ significantly from ceteris-paribus laws in physics. While several authors have doubted that normic laws are genuine laws at all, others have argued that normic laws express a certain kind of prototypical normality which is independent of statistical majo…
Bayesian pseudo-confirmation, use-novelty, and genuine confirmation
Structural correspondence, indirect reference, and partial truth
Interactive Causes
This article suggests a revision of the theory of causal nets (TCN). In section 1 we introduce an axiomatization of TCN based on a realistic understanding. It is shown that the causal Markov condition entails three independent principles. In section 2 we analyze indeterministic decay as the major counterexample to one of these principles: screening off by common causes (SCC). We call SCC-violating common causes interactive causes. In section 3 we…
Optimality justifications
No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of Meta-induction
The no free lunch theorem is a radicalized version of Hume’s induction skepticism. It asserts that relative to a uniform probability distribution over all possible worlds, all computable prediction algorithms—whether ‘clever’ inductive or ‘stupid’ guessing methods (etc.)—have the same expected predictive success. This theorem seems to be in conflict with results about meta-induction. According to these results, certain meta-inductive prediction s…
A Modeling Approach for Mechanisms Featuring Causal Cycles
Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal representation of mechanisms. Gebharter’s “A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?” suggests to represent mechanisms by means of arrows in an acyclic causal net. In this article we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also…
Pietroski and Rey on Ceteris Paribus Laws
In Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 46, Pietroski and Rey ([1995]) suggested a reconstruction of ceteris paribus (CP)‐laws, which — as they claim — saves CP‐laws from vacuity. This discussion note is intended to show that, although Pietroski and Rey's reconstruction is an improvement in comparison to previous suggestions, it cannot avoid the result that CP‐laws are almost vacuous. It is proved that if Cx is an arbitrary (nomological) event‐type which has ind…
Twelve great papers
Genuine Confirmation and Tacking by Conjunction
Tacking by conjunction is a deep problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. It is based on the insight that to each hypothesis h that is confirmed by a piece of evidence e one can ‘tack’ an irrelevant hypothesis h′ so that h∧h′ is also confirmed by e. This seems counter-intuitive. Existing Bayesian solution proposals try to soften the negative impact of this result by showing that although h∧h′ is confirmed by e, it is so only to a lower degree. I…
A frame-theoretic analysis of two rival conceptions of heat
Non-Monotonic Reasoning from an Evolution-Theoretic Perspective
Why classical logic is privileged
In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies…
Probabilistic truthlikeness, content elements, and meta-inductive probability optimization
The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness (Sects. 1, 2). In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures (t-measures) are introduced: (i) comparative versus numeric t-measures, (ii) t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and (iii) t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthli…
The material theory of object-induction and the universal optimality of meta-induction
The new Tweety puzzle
Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds
Meta-induction, in its various forms, is an imitative prediction method, where the prediction methods and the predictions of other agents are imitated to the extent that those methods or agents have proven successful in the past. In past work, Schurz demonstrated the optimality of meta-induction as a method for predicting unknown events and quantities. However, much recent discussion, along with formal and empirical work, on the Wisdom of Crowds …
Explanations in Science and the Logic of Why-Questions
Outline of a theory of scientific understanding
The Is-Ought Problem
Can OUGHT be derived from IS? This book presents an investigation of this time-honored problem by means of alethic-deontic predicate logic. New in this study is the leitmotif of relevance: is-ought inferences indeed exist, but they are all irrelevant in a precise logical sense. New proof techniques establish this result for very broad classes of logics. A profound philosophical analysis of is-ought bridge principles supplements the logical study.…
Explanation as Unification
What is ‘Normal‘? An Evolution-Theoretic Foundation for Normic Laws and Their Relation to Statistical Normality
Normic laws have the form “if A, then normally B.” They are omnipresent in everyday life and non-physical ‘life’ sciences such as biology, psychology, social sciences, and humanities. They differ significantly from ceteris-paribus laws in physics. While several authors have doubted that normic laws are genuine laws at all, others have argued that normic laws express a certain kind of prototypical normality which is independent of statistical majo…
Pietroski and Rey on Ceteris Paribus Laws
In Brit. J. Phil. Sci., 46, Pietroski and Rey ([1995]) suggested a reconstruction of ceteris paribus (CP)‐laws, which — as they claim — saves CP‐laws from vacuity. This discussion note is intended to show that, although Pietroski and Rey's reconstruction is an improvement in comparison to previous suggestions, it cannot avoid the result that CP‐laws are almost vacuous. It is proved that if Cx is an arbitrary (nomological) event‐type which has ind…
McCall and Raatikainen on Mechanism and Incompleteness
Non-Monotonic Reasoning from an Evolution-Theoretic Perspective
Explanations in Science and the Logic of Why-Questions
Patterns of abduction
The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game
This article suggests a ‘best alternative’ justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction meth…
When Empirical Success Implies Theoretical Reference
Starting from a brief recapitulation of the contemporary debate on scientific realism, this paper argues for the following thesis: Assume a theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of application A, but was superseded later on by a superior theory T*, which was likewise successful in A but has an arbitrarily different theoretical superstructure. Then under natural conditions T contains certain theoretical expressions, which yielded T'…
Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem holds for possible-world-accounts but not for consequence-accounts to verisimilitude
Structural correspondence between theories and convergence to truth
Structural correspondence, indirect reference, and partial truth
Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds
Meta-induction, in its various forms, is an imitative prediction method, where the prediction methods and the predictions of other agents are imitated to the extent that those methods or agents have proven successful in the past. In past work, Schurz demonstrated the optimality of meta-induction as a method for predicting unknown events and quantities. However, much recent discussion, along with formal and empirical work, on the Wisdom of Crowds …
A frame-theoretic analysis of two rival conceptions of heat
Die multiparadigmatische Struktur der Wissenschaften
Die Multiparadigmatische Struktur der Wissenschaften
The new Tweety puzzle
Bayesian pseudo-confirmation, use-novelty, and genuine confirmation
Introduction
Introduction to the special issue “Causation, probability, and truth—the philosophy of Clark Glymour”
Causality as a theoretical concept
A Modeling Approach for Mechanisms Featuring Causal Cycles
Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal representation of mechanisms. Gebharter’s “A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms?” suggests to represent mechanisms by means of arrows in an acyclic causal net. In this article we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also…
Epsa15 Selected Papers
Epistemology (38 obras) · Philosophy (38 obras) · Computer Science (29 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (29 obras) · Mathematics (27 obras) · Metaphysics (19 obras) · Philosophy of science (18 obras) · Mathematical economics (16 obras) · Philosophy of language (16 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (15 obras)