Henry E Kyburg
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 964586 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Henry E Kyburg |
| NOMBRES | Henry E |
| APELLIDO | Kyburg |
| FIRMA | KYBURG H E |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Rochester |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 38 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 48 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 38 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1958 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2006 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Belief, Evidence, and Conditioning
Since Ramsey, much discussion of the relation between probability and belief has taken for granted that there are degrees of belief, i.e., that there is a real-valued function, B , that characterizes the degree of belief that an agent has in each statement of his language. It is then supposed that B is a probability. It is then often supposed that as the agent accumulates evidence, this function should be updated by conditioning: $B^{E}(\cdot) $ …
Don't Take Unnecessary Chances
Quantities, Magnitudes, and Numbers
Quantities are naturally viewed as functions, whose arguments may be construed as situations, events, objects, etc. We explore the question of the range of these functions: should it be construed as the real numbers (or some subset thereof)? This is Carnap's view. It has attractive features, specifically, what Carnap views as ontological economy. Or should the range of a quantity be a set of magnitudes? This may have been Helmholtz's view, and it…
Keynes as a Philosopher
Research Article| December 01 1995 Keynes as a Philosopher Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1995) 27 (Supplement): 7–32. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-27-Supplement-7 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Henry E. Kyburg; Keynes as a Philosopher. History of Political Economy 1 December 199…
The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing
Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction
In this book Pollock deals with the subject of probabilistic reasoning, making general philosophical sense of objective probabilities and exploring their relationship to the problem of induction. He argues that probability is fundamental not only to physical science, but to induction, epistemology, the philosophy of science and much of the reasoning relevant to artificial intelligence. Pollock's main claim is that the fundamental notion of probab…
Getting fancy with probability
Against conditionalization
Extended Review
Journal Article Extended Review: Some Recent Work on Probability Get access Probability, Objectivity and Evidence. By F. C. Benenson (London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. Pp. ix + 284. Price £19.95) Epistemology and Inference. By Henry E. Kyburg, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 318. Price $39.50 [cloth], $15.95 [paper]) Probabilistic Metaphysics. By Patrick Suppes. (Oxford and New York: …
Decisions and Revisions
The Confirmation of Quantitative Laws
Quantitative laws are more typical of science than are generalizations involving observational predicates, yet much discussion of scientific inference takes the confirmation of a universal generalization by its instances to be typical and paradigmatic. The important difference is that measurement necessarily involves error. It is argued that because of error laws can no more be refuted by observation than they can be verified by observation. With…
Levi, Petersen, and Direct Inference
In (1981), Levi has laid out the issues involving chances, frequencies, and direct inference with admirable precision. Nevertheless, puzzles remain. The chief puzzle to which I wish to draw attention is this: Under certain circumstances, we can combine knowledge of chances and knowledge of frequencies to yield new knowledge of chances. If Petersen is “drawn at random” from among Swedes, and we also know that the proportion of Protestants among Sw…
The Reference Class
The system presented by the author in The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference (Kyburg 1974) suffered from certain technical difficulties, and from a major practical difficulty; it was hard to be sure, in discussing examples and applications, when you had got hold of the right reference class. The present paper, concerned mainly with the characterization of randomness, resolves the technical difficulties and provides a well structured fra…
Leeds' Infernal Machine
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Acts and conditional probabilities
Chance, Cause, Reason
Tyche and Athena
How to Make Up a Theory
Reply to Professor Freudenthal
Decisions, conclusions, and utilities
Local and Global Induction
Bruno de Finetti. Probability, induction and statistics . New York
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Epistemological probability
Induction, Probability, and Causation
More on Maximal Specificity
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Against conditionalization
Salmon's Paper
First, a comment on a pessimistic note: Salmon says we can't be sure there is any such thing as inductive inference: in demanding that some explanations have the form of correct inductive inferences, “we may be laying down a requirement which cannot be fulfilled.” To doubt that we can fulfill that requirement is to doubt that we can formalize inductive logic. It may be true, but why begin the fight by throwing in the sponge ? It is also true that…
The Reference Class
The system presented by the author in The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference (Kyburg 1974) suffered from certain technical difficulties, and from a major practical difficulty; it was hard to be sure, in discussing examples and applications, when you had got hold of the right reference class. The present paper, concerned mainly with the characterization of randomness, resolves the technical difficulties and provides a well structured fra…
The Jones Case
Quantities, Magnitudes, and Numbers
Quantities are naturally viewed as functions, whose arguments may be construed as situations, events, objects, etc. We explore the question of the range of these functions: should it be construed as the real numbers (or some subset thereof)? This is Carnap's view. It has attractive features, specifically, what Carnap views as ontological economy. Or should the range of a quantity be a set of magnitudes? This may have been Helmholtz's view, and it…
Keynes as a Philosopher
Research Article| December 01 1995 Keynes as a Philosopher Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1995) 27 (Supplement): 7–32. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-27-Supplement-7 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Henry E. Kyburg; Keynes as a Philosopher. History of Political Economy 1 December 199…
Tyche and Athena
Belief, Evidence, and Conditioning
Since Ramsey, much discussion of the relation between probability and belief has taken for granted that there are degrees of belief, i.e., that there is a real-valued function, B , that characterizes the degree of belief that an agent has in each statement of his language. It is then supposed that B is a probability. It is then often supposed that as the agent accumulates evidence, this function should be updated by conditioning: $B^{E}(\cdot) $ …
Don't Take Unnecessary Chances
The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing
Getting fancy with probability
Levi, Petersen, and Direct Inference
In (1981), Levi has laid out the issues involving chances, frequencies, and direct inference with admirable precision. Nevertheless, puzzles remain. The chief puzzle to which I wish to draw attention is this: Under certain circumstances, we can combine knowledge of chances and knowledge of frequencies to yield new knowledge of chances. If Petersen is “drawn at random” from among Swedes, and we also know that the proportion of Protestants among Sw…
Epistemological probability
Probability and Rationality
Probability and Rationality Get access Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Wesleyan University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 11, Issue 44, July 1961, Pages 193–200, https://doi.org/10.2307/2216621 Published: 01 July 1961
Demonstrative Induction
R. B. Braithwaite on Probability and Induction 1
Demonstrative Induction
A Modest Proposal Concerning Simplicity
Probability and Rationality
Probability and Rationality Get access Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Wesleyan University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 11, Issue 44, July 1961, Pages 193–200, https://doi.org/10.2307/2216621 Published: 01 July 1961
Foresight and Understanding
Statistical and Inductive Probabilities
Salmon's Paper
First, a comment on a pessimistic note: Salmon says we can't be sure there is any such thing as inductive inference: in demanding that some explanations have the form of correct inductive inferences, “we may be laying down a requirement which cannot be fulfilled.” To doubt that we can fulfill that requirement is to doubt that we can formalize inductive logic. It may be true, but why begin the fight by throwing in the sponge ? It is also true that…
Intension and Decision
Induction
Probability and Decision
One hears increasingly from philosophers that statistical inference is a technical study that is well in control by statisticians and should be left to them; and one hears, increasingly, from mathematical statisticians that all this talk about interpretations of probability is so much philosophical frosting that is utterly irrelevant to the serious business of producing mathematical statistics. “The more interpretations of probability there are, …
Aspects of Inductive Logic
The Jones Case
More on Maximal Specificity
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Philosophy of Science
Book Reviews Get access Philosophy of Science : A Formal Approach. By Henry E., Kyburg. (New York : The Macmillan Company. London : Collier-Macmillan. 1968. Pp. xiii + 332. Price 75s) J. R. Cameron J. R. Cameron Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 80, July 1970, Pages 294–295, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218425 Published: 01 July 1970
Epistemological probability
Induction, Probability, and Causation
Bruno de Finetti. Probability, induction and statistics . New York
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Local and Global Induction
Reply to Professor Freudenthal
Decisions, conclusions, and utilities
How to Make Up a Theory
Chance, Cause, Reason
Tyche and Athena
Acts and conditional probabilities
Leeds' Infernal Machine
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Philosophy (35 obras) · Epistemology (32 obras) · Computer Science (17 obras) · Mathematics (12 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (12 obras) · Mathematical economics (10 obras) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (9 obras) · Contemporary philosophy (9 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 obras) · Philosophy of science (9 obras)