Stathis Psillo
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 965617 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Stathis Psillo |
| NOMBRES | Stathis |
| APELLIDO | Psillo |
| FIRMA | PSILLO S |
| AFILIACIONES | National and Kapodistrian University of Athens |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2910-5098 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 32 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 136 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 32 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1996 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 8 |
Searching for the General Science of Evidence
In this paper Venn's account of probability inference and induction is examined, tracing their differences as well as how they ‘co-operate’ in inferences from particulars to particulars. We discuss the role of mathematical idealizations in making probability inferences, the celebrated rule of succession and we delve into the nature of the reference class problem arguing that for Venn it is a common problem for both induction and inference in prob…
In Science We Trust
Introduction to the Special Issue
This is the introduction to the special issue “The Meta-Inductive Approach to Hume’s Problem”. The introduction includes introductory remarks and brief comments on each of the papers appearing in the special issue
Scientific Ontology
In this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. After a brief presentation of the project of stance-based ontology (Section 2), I move on to criticize Chakravartty's account of metaphysical inference (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I take issue with Chakravartty's view that fundamental debates in metaphysics inevitably lead to irresolvable disagreement, while in Section 5, the conce…
Scientific realism
Counterfactual Reasoning, Qualitative
Living with the abstract
On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism
Choosing the realist framework
Scientific Realism
In this paper, I discuss the prospects of nominalistic scientific realism (NSR) and show that it fails on many counts. In section 2, I discuss what is required for NSR to get off the ground. In section 3, I question the idea that theories have well-defined nominalistic content and the idea that causal activity is a necessary condition for commitment to the reality of an entity. In section 4, I challenge the notion of nominalistic adequacy of theo…
Causal Pluralism
Grasping At Realist Straws
The Fine Structure of Inference to the Best Explanation
The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure
This paper is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. Therefore, pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has ‘excess structure’ over the structure of appearances. The main point is that the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, Section 4 argues directly against ontic st…
What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested
In the present paper, I offer a conceptual argument against the view that all properties are pure powers. I claim that thinking of all properties as pure powers leads to a regress. The regress, I argue, can be solved only if non‐powers are admitted. The kernel of my thesis is that any attempt to answer the title question in an informative way will undermine a pure‐power view of properties. In particular, I focus my critique on recent arguments in…
Philosophy of Language and the Challenge to Scientific Realism. By Christopher Norris
Scientific Realism
Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it . In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiric…
Tracking the Real
In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can ac…
Causation and Explanation
Stathis Psillos divides his account into three sections: causation, laws of nature, and explanation. He begins the causation section with Hume's classic "reductive" account and then focuses on the subsequent division between Humean and non-Humean accounts, examining topics such as regularities and singular causation, causation and counterfactuals, and causation and mechanism
Causation and Explanation
What is the nature of causation? How is causation linked with explanation? Can there be an adequate theory of explanation? These questions and many others are addressed in this unified and rigorous examination of the philosophical problems surrounding causation, laws and explanation. Part 1 of the book explores Hume's views on causation, theories of singular causation, and counterfactual and mechanistic approaches. Part 2 considers the regularity…
Relativism and Reality
Our thoughts about the world are clearly influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, past experience and culture. However, some thinkers go much further and argue that everything that exists depends on us, arguing that 'even reality is relative'. Can we accept such a claim in the face of events such as floods and other natural disasters or events seemingly beyond our control? 'Realists' argue that reality is independent of out thinki…
What if there are laws of nature? Reflections on van Fraassen’s Laws and Symmetry
Book notice
Resisting scientific anti-realism
Causation, from a human point of view
Is Structural Realism Possible
This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker real…
On Van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Reasoning
Adoptant l'attitude critique propre a A. Menuge, l'A. montre que ni l'argument du mauvais lot, ni l'argument de l'indifference, ni la conception de la non-observabilite, developpes par Van Fraassen contre le raisonnement adbuctif, ne parviennent a refuter le principe du privilege et l'approximation de la verite qui fondent l'empirisme constructif
Living with the abstract
The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure
This paper is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. Therefore, pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has ‘excess structure’ over the structure of appearances. The main point is that the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, Section 4 argues directly against ontic st…
Choosing the realist framework
The Fine Structure of Inference to the Best Explanation
What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested
In the present paper, I offer a conceptual argument against the view that all properties are pure powers. I claim that thinking of all properties as pure powers leads to a regress. The regress, I argue, can be solved only if non‐powers are admitted. The kernel of my thesis is that any attempt to answer the title question in an informative way will undermine a pure‐power view of properties. In particular, I focus my critique on recent arguments in…
Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’
Over the last two decades, the debate over scientific realism has been dominated by two arguments that pull in contrary directions: the ‘no miracle’ argument and the ‘pessimistic induction’. The latter suggests that the historical record destroys the realist’s belief in an explanatory connection between truthlikeness and genuine empirical success. This paper analyzes the structure of the ‘pessimistic induction’, presents a move—the divide et impe…
The present state of the scientific realism debate
In this survey article I try to appraise the present state of the scientific realism debate with an eye to important but hitherto unexplored suggestions and open issues that need further work. In Section 2, I mostly focus on the relationship between scientific realism and truth. In Section 3, I discuss the grounds for realists' epistemic optimism.
On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism
Tracking the Real
In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can ac…
How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism
Journal Article How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism: A Rejoinder Get access Stathis Psillos Stathis Psillos London School of Economics; e‐mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 188, July 1997, Pages 369–372, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00066 Published: 07 January 2003
Scientific Ontology
In this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. After a brief presentation of the project of stance-based ontology (Section 2), I move on to criticize Chakravartty's account of metaphysical inference (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I take issue with Chakravartty's view that fundamental debates in metaphysics inevitably lead to irresolvable disagreement, while in Section 5, the conce…
Scientific Realism
In this paper, I discuss the prospects of nominalistic scientific realism (NSR) and show that it fails on many counts. In section 2, I discuss what is required for NSR to get off the ground. In section 3, I question the idea that theories have well-defined nominalistic content and the idea that causal activity is a necessary condition for commitment to the reality of an entity. In section 4, I challenge the notion of nominalistic adequacy of theo…
Scientific realism
Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’
Over the last two decades, the debate over scientific realism has been dominated by two arguments that pull in contrary directions: the ‘no miracle’ argument and the ‘pessimistic induction’. The latter suggests that the historical record destroys the realist’s belief in an explanatory connection between truthlikeness and genuine empirical success. This paper analyzes the structure of the ‘pessimistic induction’, presents a move—the divide et impe…
On Van Fraassen's Critique of Abductive Reasoning
Adoptant l'attitude critique propre a A. Menuge, l'A. montre que ni l'argument du mauvais lot, ni l'argument de l'indifference, ni la conception de la non-observabilite, developpes par Van Fraassen contre le raisonnement adbuctif, ne parviennent a refuter le principe du privilege et l'approximation de la verite qui fondent l'empirisme constructif
How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism
Journal Article How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism: A Rejoinder Get access Stathis Psillos Stathis Psillos London School of Economics; e‐mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 188, July 1997, Pages 369–372, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00066 Published: 07 January 2003
The present state of the scientific realism debate
In this survey article I try to appraise the present state of the scientific realism debate with an eye to important but hitherto unexplored suggestions and open issues that need further work. In Section 2, I mostly focus on the relationship between scientific realism and truth. In Section 3, I discuss the grounds for realists' epistemic optimism.
Author’s response
Predictive Similarity and the Success of Science
P. Kyle Stanford (2000) attempts to offer a truth-linked explanation of the success of science which, he thinks, can be welcome to antirealists. He proposes an explanation of the success of a theory T 1 in terms of its predictive similarity to the true theory T of the relevant domain. After raising some qualms about the supposed antirealist credentials of Stanford's account, I examine his explanatory story in some detail and show that it fails to…
Is Structural Realism Possible
This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker real…
Causation and Explanation
What is the nature of causation? How is causation linked with explanation? Can there be an adequate theory of explanation? These questions and many others are addressed in this unified and rigorous examination of the philosophical problems surrounding causation, laws and explanation. Part 1 of the book explores Hume's views on causation, theories of singular causation, and counterfactual and mechanistic approaches. Part 2 considers the regularity…
Relativism and Reality
Our thoughts about the world are clearly influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, past experience and culture. However, some thinkers go much further and argue that everything that exists depends on us, arguing that 'even reality is relative'. Can we accept such a claim in the face of events such as floods and other natural disasters or events seemingly beyond our control? 'Realists' argue that reality is independent of out thinki…
Causation and Explanation
Stathis Psillos divides his account into three sections: causation, laws of nature, and explanation. He begins the causation section with Hume's classic "reductive" account and then focuses on the subsequent division between Humean and non-Humean accounts, examining topics such as regularities and singular causation, causation and counterfactuals, and causation and mechanism
Tracking the Real
In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can ac…
Philosophy of Language and the Challenge to Scientific Realism. By Christopher Norris
Scientific Realism
Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it . In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiric…
The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure
This paper is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. Therefore, pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has ‘excess structure’ over the structure of appearances. The main point is that the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, Section 4 argues directly against ontic st…
What Do Powers Do When They Are Not Manifested
In the present paper, I offer a conceptual argument against the view that all properties are pure powers. I claim that thinking of all properties as pure powers leads to a regress. The regress, I argue, can be solved only if non‐powers are admitted. The kernel of my thesis is that any attempt to answer the title question in an informative way will undermine a pure‐power view of properties. In particular, I focus my critique on recent arguments in…
The Fine Structure of Inference to the Best Explanation
Causal Pluralism
Grasping At Realist Straws
Scientific Realism
In this paper, I discuss the prospects of nominalistic scientific realism (NSR) and show that it fails on many counts. In section 2, I discuss what is required for NSR to get off the ground. In section 3, I question the idea that theories have well-defined nominalistic content and the idea that causal activity is a necessary condition for commitment to the reality of an entity. In section 4, I challenge the notion of nominalistic adequacy of theo…
Living with the abstract
On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism
Choosing the realist framework
Counterfactual Reasoning, Qualitative
Scientific realism
Scientific Ontology
In this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. After a brief presentation of the project of stance-based ontology (Section 2), I move on to criticize Chakravartty's account of metaphysical inference (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I take issue with Chakravartty's view that fundamental debates in metaphysics inevitably lead to irresolvable disagreement, while in Section 5, the conce…
Epistemology (29 obras) · Philosophy (29 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (24 obras) · Philosophy of science (12 obras) · Realism (12 obras) · Computer Science (11 obras) · Scientific realism (11 obras) · Science and Climate Studies (8 obras) · Metaphysics (7 obras) · Philosophy of biology (6 obras)