Theodore Sider
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 973385 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Theodore Sider |
| NOMBRES | Theodore |
| APELLIDO | Sider |
| FIRMA | SIDER T |
| AFILIACIONES | Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9142-0590 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 25 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 169 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1992 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2022 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Dasgupta's Detonation
In “Putnam's Paradox”, David Lewis defended the “realist philosophy we know and love” against Hilary Putnam's “bomb”, an argument that a realist must count practically any consistent theory as being true. Many of us thought that Lewis defused that bomb with his “reference magnetism” (and many more would have, had that doctrine been properly understood1). But Shamik Dasgupta (2018) has devised a new bomb. Not only would it demolish Lewis's respons…
The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science
Metaphysics is sensitive to the conceptual tools we choose to articulate metaphysical problems. Those tools are a lens through which we view metaphysical problems; the same problems look different when we change the lens. There has recently been a shift to "postmodal" conceptual tools: concepts of ground, essence, and fundamentality. This shift transforms the debate over structuralism, in many ways. For instance: structuralist theses say that "pa…
Précis of Writing the Book of the World
physicists use words like ‘charge’, ‘mass’, and ‘distance’, but nothing would be wrong with instead describing the world using cooked-up words derived from those of physics in the way that Goodman’s ‘grue ’ and ‘bleen ’ are derived from ‘green ’ and ‘blue’. My central thesis is that there is a ready-made world. There is a set of objec-tively privileged concepts: the “fundamental”, or “joint-carving”, or “structural” ones. A complete description o…
Replies to Dorr, Fine, and Hirsch
Writing the Book of the World
"In order to describe the world perfectly, one must describe it in its own terms. In this ambitious and comprehensive book, Theodore Sider argues that for a representation to be fully successful, truth is not enough; the representation must also use the right concepts-concepts that 'carve at the joints'-so that its conceptual structure matches reality's structure. There is an objectively correct way to 'write the book of the world'. Sider's argum…
Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument Against Coincident Entities
Statues and lumps of clay are said by some to coincide—to be numeri-cally distinct despite being made up of the same parts. They are said to be numerically distinct because they differ modally. Coincident objects would be non-modally indiscernible, and thus appear to violate the super-venience of modal properties on nonmodal properties. But coincidence and supervenience are in fact consistent if the most fundamental modal features are not propert…
Parthood
Riddles of Existence
Bare Particulars”
Précis of Four‐Dimensionalism
Replies to Gallois, Hirsch and Markosian
Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience
A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical supervenience by Trenton Merrick's. The argument assumes that consciousness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic
What's So Bad About Overdetermination
The Worlds of Possibility
The Worlds of Possibility
Maximality and Intrinsic Properties
A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are thus extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis. Their theory implies that “non-disjunctive ” properties are intrinsic if they are independent of “loneliness”; but many ordinary, apparently nondisjunctive, p…
Four-dimensionalism
Simply Possible
Michael Jubien, Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference
Global Supervenience and Identity across Times and Worlds
The existence and importance of supervenience principles for identity across times and worlds have been noted, but insufcient attention has been paid to their precise nature. Such attention is repaid with philo-sophical dividends. The issues in the formulation of the supervenience principles are two. The rst involves the relevant variety of supervenience: that variety is global, but there are in fact two versions of global super-venience that mus…
Four-Dimensionalism
A New Grandfather Paradox
In an article in Scienti c American (March 1994, pp. 68–74) entitled “The Quantum Physics of Time Travel”, Oxford physicist David Deutsch and Oxford philosopher Michael Lockwood give a defense of the physical possibility of time travel based on the “Many Worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics. This positive view of theirs is not my concern, however—I want to quarrel with their argument that time travel cannot be accommodated in any other way…
Sorensen on Unknowable Obligations
Vagueness in the phrase ‘can know’ aside, the principle of (Access) An act is obligatory only if its agent can know that it is obligatory is an important principle, worthy of serious scrutiny. Its truth or falsity bears on the question of whether moral rightness, obligatoriness, etc., are a matter of factors ‘internal’ to an agent (such as motives and beliefs), or whether ‘external’ factors (such as consequences) are relevant to determining the m…
In Defense of Global Supervenience
Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind.The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties.But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psychophysical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on…
Might Theory X Be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value?
Journal Article Might theory X be a theory of diminishing marginal value? Get access Theodore R. Sider Theodore R. Sider University of MassachusettsAmherst, MA 01003, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 51, Issue 4, October 1991, Pages 265–271, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/51.4.265 Published: 01 October 1991
Parthood
What's So Bad About Overdetermination
Four-Dimensionalism
Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience
A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical supervenience by Trenton Merrick's. The argument assumes that consciousness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic
Bare Particulars”
In Defense of Global Supervenience
Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind.The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties.But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psychophysical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on…
Global Supervenience and Identity across Times and Worlds
The existence and importance of supervenience principles for identity across times and worlds have been noted, but insufcient attention has been paid to their precise nature. Such attention is repaid with philo-sophical dividends. The issues in the formulation of the supervenience principles are two. The rst involves the relevant variety of supervenience: that variety is global, but there are in fact two versions of global super-venience that mus…
Replies to Dorr, Fine, and Hirsch
Replies to Gallois, Hirsch and Markosian
Précis of Four‐Dimensionalism
Simply Possible
Dasgupta's Detonation
In “Putnam's Paradox”, David Lewis defended the “realist philosophy we know and love” against Hilary Putnam's “bomb”, an argument that a realist must count practically any consistent theory as being true. Many of us thought that Lewis defused that bomb with his “reference magnetism” (and many more would have, had that doctrine been properly understood1). But Shamik Dasgupta (2018) has devised a new bomb. Not only would it demolish Lewis's respons…
Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument Against Coincident Entities
Statues and lumps of clay are said by some to coincide—to be numeri-cally distinct despite being made up of the same parts. They are said to be numerically distinct because they differ modally. Coincident objects would be non-modally indiscernible, and thus appear to violate the super-venience of modal properties on nonmodal properties. But coincidence and supervenience are in fact consistent if the most fundamental modal features are not propert…
Maximality and Intrinsic Properties
A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are thus extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis. Their theory implies that “non-disjunctive ” properties are intrinsic if they are independent of “loneliness”; but many ordinary, apparently nondisjunctive, p…
A New Grandfather Paradox
In an article in Scienti c American (March 1994, pp. 68–74) entitled “The Quantum Physics of Time Travel”, Oxford physicist David Deutsch and Oxford philosopher Michael Lockwood give a defense of the physical possibility of time travel based on the “Many Worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics. This positive view of theirs is not my concern, however—I want to quarrel with their argument that time travel cannot be accommodated in any other way…
Sorensen on Unknowable Obligations
Vagueness in the phrase ‘can know’ aside, the principle of (Access) An act is obligatory only if its agent can know that it is obligatory is an important principle, worthy of serious scrutiny. Its truth or falsity bears on the question of whether moral rightness, obligatoriness, etc., are a matter of factors ‘internal’ to an agent (such as motives and beliefs), or whether ‘external’ factors (such as consequences) are relevant to determining the m…
In Defense of Global Supervenience
Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind.The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties.But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psychophysical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on…
Sorensen on Unknowable Obligations
Vagueness in the phrase ‘can know’ aside, the principle of (Access) An act is obligatory only if its agent can know that it is obligatory is an important principle, worthy of serious scrutiny. Its truth or falsity bears on the question of whether moral rightness, obligatoriness, etc., are a matter of factors ‘internal’ to an agent (such as motives and beliefs), or whether ‘external’ factors (such as consequences) are relevant to determining the m…
Four-Dimensionalism
A New Grandfather Paradox
In an article in Scienti c American (March 1994, pp. 68–74) entitled “The Quantum Physics of Time Travel”, Oxford physicist David Deutsch and Oxford philosopher Michael Lockwood give a defense of the physical possibility of time travel based on the “Many Worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics. This positive view of theirs is not my concern, however—I want to quarrel with their argument that time travel cannot be accommodated in any other way…
Michael Jubien, Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference
Global Supervenience and Identity across Times and Worlds
The existence and importance of supervenience principles for identity across times and worlds have been noted, but insufcient attention has been paid to their precise nature. Such attention is repaid with philo-sophical dividends. The issues in the formulation of the supervenience principles are two. The rst involves the relevant variety of supervenience: that variety is global, but there are in fact two versions of global super-venience that mus…
Simply Possible
The Worlds of Possibility
The Worlds of Possibility
Maximality and Intrinsic Properties
A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are thus extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis. Their theory implies that “non-disjunctive ” properties are intrinsic if they are independent of “loneliness”; but many ordinary, apparently nondisjunctive, p…
Four-dimensionalism
Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience
A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs. Maximal properties are typically extrinsic, for their instantiation by x depends on what larger things x is part of. This makes trouble for a recent argument against microphysical supervenience by Trenton Merrick's. The argument assumes that consciousness is an intrinsic property, whereas consciousness is in fact maximal and extrinsic
What's So Bad About Overdetermination
Précis of Four‐Dimensionalism
Replies to Gallois, Hirsch and Markosian
Bare Particulars”
Parthood
Riddles of Existence
Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument Against Coincident Entities
Statues and lumps of clay are said by some to coincide—to be numeri-cally distinct despite being made up of the same parts. They are said to be numerically distinct because they differ modally. Coincident objects would be non-modally indiscernible, and thus appear to violate the super-venience of modal properties on nonmodal properties. But coincidence and supervenience are in fact consistent if the most fundamental modal features are not propert…
Writing the Book of the World
"In order to describe the world perfectly, one must describe it in its own terms. In this ambitious and comprehensive book, Theodore Sider argues that for a representation to be fully successful, truth is not enough; the representation must also use the right concepts-concepts that 'carve at the joints'-so that its conceptual structure matches reality's structure. There is an objectively correct way to 'write the book of the world'. Sider's argum…
Précis of Writing the Book of the World
physicists use words like ‘charge’, ‘mass’, and ‘distance’, but nothing would be wrong with instead describing the world using cooked-up words derived from those of physics in the way that Goodman’s ‘grue ’ and ‘bleen ’ are derived from ‘green ’ and ‘blue’. My central thesis is that there is a ready-made world. There is a set of objec-tively privileged concepts: the “fundamental”, or “joint-carving”, or “structural” ones. A complete description o…
Replies to Dorr, Fine, and Hirsch
The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science
Metaphysics is sensitive to the conceptual tools we choose to articulate metaphysical problems. Those tools are a lens through which we view metaphysical problems; the same problems look different when we change the lens. There has recently been a shift to "postmodal" conceptual tools: concepts of ground, essence, and fundamentality. This shift transforms the debate over structuralism, in many ways. For instance: structuralist theses say that "pa…
Dasgupta's Detonation
In “Putnam's Paradox”, David Lewis defended the “realist philosophy we know and love” against Hilary Putnam's “bomb”, an argument that a realist must count practically any consistent theory as being true. Many of us thought that Lewis defused that bomb with his “reference magnetism” (and many more would have, had that doctrine been properly understood1). But Shamik Dasgupta (2018) has devised a new bomb. Not only would it demolish Lewis's respons…
Might Theory X Be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value?
Journal Article Might theory X be a theory of diminishing marginal value? Get access Theodore R. Sider Theodore R. Sider University of MassachusettsAmherst, MA 01003, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 51, Issue 4, October 1991, Pages 265–271, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/51.4.265 Published: 01 October 1991
Philosophy (21 obras) · Epistemology (15 obras) · Philosophy (14 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (13 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 obras) · Metaphysics (8 obras) · Citation (6 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Library science (6 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 obras)