Sean Mckeever
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 980822 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Sean Mckeever |
| NOMBRES | Sean |
| APELLIDO | Mckeever |
| FIRMA | MCKEEVER S |
| AFILIACIONES | Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College, North Carolina. |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 14 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 33 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2005 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2015 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics
People often say that some normative ethical theory, act consequentialism perhaps, faces some objection based on ‘obvious intuitions’. It is also sometimes said—e.g. by Bernard Williams—that a theory like act consequentialism can make some things too obvious; can make obvious things that aren’t obvious but deeply morally problematic and troubling even if correct. Ridge and McKeever agree that objections of Williams’ sort can sometimes have some w…
Preempting Principles
Moral particularism, as recently defended, charges that traditional moral theorizing unduly privileges moral principles. Moral generalism defends a prominent place for moral principles. Because moral principles are often asked to play multiple roles, moral particularism aims at multiple targets. We distinguish two leading roles for moral principles, the role of standard and the role of guide. We critically survey some of the leading arguments bot…
Ethics without Principles
Book Review| January 01 2007 Ethics without Principles Jonathan Dancy, Ethics without Principles. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. x + 229 pp. Michael Ridge; Michael Ridge Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Sean McKeever Sean McKeever Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 124–128. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-027 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter…
Constitutive Generalism
According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘con…
From Moral Knowledge to Default Principles
This chapter argues that the bare possibility of moral knowledge in particular cases is already enough to ensure the availability of a certain sort of ‘hedged’ moral principle called a ‘default principle’. Default principles are consistent with holism about reasons because they claim that a given action has a given moral property only if no further feature of the situation explains why it does not. One obvious worry about this proposal is that de…
Holism about Reasons
Particularists often try to draw support for their view from the alleged context sensitivity of reasons, and more specifically holism. According to holism about reasons, a consideration that is a reason in one context may not be similarly a reason in another context because of differences in the presence or absence of defeating and enabling conditions. This chapter distinguishes several versions of the argument from holism, and shows that despite…
Generalism as a Regulative Ideal
This chapter argues that there are reasons to try to codify the moral landscape, and that these reasons are recognizably moral. A proper understanding of the nature of historical moral progress bolsters this argument. The task of codifying morality is best understood as a collective one. Like many collective tasks, it is most efficiently pursued with a suitable division of labor. The chapter defends some of the traditional notions of moral theory…
Moral Vision
Particularism is commonly associated with a moral epistemology that takes perception as a model. This chapter argues that in so far as moral judgments are made by ‘just looking’, this does nothing to support particularism. A close examination of the role of rules and principles in chess helps make this point. Although metaphors of vision are commonplace in discussions of chess (the master ‘just sees’ that the position is weak), this rightly does …
Many Moral Particularisms
This chapter identifies moral particularism as a family of theses all of which involve some sort of negative assessment of moral principles. Family members are distinguished by the different negative attitudes taken and by different conceptions of what a moral principle is. It argues that a proper evaluation of the arguments for moral particularism must be sensitive to these distinctions.
Default Reasons
Because of its extremely ecumenical view of what considerations might count as reasons, particularism threatens to ‘flatten the moral landscape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for example pain and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid this result, particularists can try to draw a distinction between default and non-default reas…
Beyond Default Principles
This chapter argues against the hedged principles laid out in Chapter 6. It contends that the best explanation of the possibility of practical wisdom entails that morality can be codified. It gives three main arguments. The first argument contends that generalism as a regulative ideal better preserves a broad scope for practical wisdom than its particularist rivals. In pressing this argument, it is shown how generalism is better situated to accom…
Principled Guidance
Morality is a practical matter that concerns choice and action, and a sound moral outlook should be capable of motivating someone to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that moral principles might play an important role in guiding action. This final chapter addresses this concern, and explains how moral principles can and should play an important role in guiding action. Moral principles can help us avoid the all too human failings o…
Principled Ethics
Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. This book meets this particularist challenge head on and defends a distinctive view called ‘genera…
What Does Holism Have to Do With Moral Particularism
Moral particularists are united in their opposition to the codification of morality, and their work poses an important challenge to traditional ways of thinking about moral philosophy. Defenders of moral particularism have, with near unanimity, sought support from a doctrine they call ‘holism in the theory of reasons.’ We argue that this is all a mistake. There are two ways in which holism in the theory of reasons can be understood, but neither p…
Principled Ethics
Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. This book meets this particularist challenge head on and defends a distinctive view called ‘genera…
What Does Holism Have to Do With Moral Particularism
Moral particularists are united in their opposition to the codification of morality, and their work poses an important challenge to traditional ways of thinking about moral philosophy. Defenders of moral particularism have, with near unanimity, sought support from a doctrine they call ‘holism in the theory of reasons.’ We argue that this is all a mistake. There are two ways in which holism in the theory of reasons can be understood, but neither p…
Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics
People often say that some normative ethical theory, act consequentialism perhaps, faces some objection based on ‘obvious intuitions’. It is also sometimes said—e.g. by Bernard Williams—that a theory like act consequentialism can make some things too obvious; can make obvious things that aren’t obvious but deeply morally problematic and troubling even if correct. Ridge and McKeever agree that objections of Williams’ sort can sometimes have some w…
Preempting Principles
Moral particularism, as recently defended, charges that traditional moral theorizing unduly privileges moral principles. Moral generalism defends a prominent place for moral principles. Because moral principles are often asked to play multiple roles, moral particularism aims at multiple targets. We distinguish two leading roles for moral principles, the role of standard and the role of guide. We critically survey some of the leading arguments bot…
What Does Holism Have to Do With Moral Particularism
Moral particularists are united in their opposition to the codification of morality, and their work poses an important challenge to traditional ways of thinking about moral philosophy. Defenders of moral particularism have, with near unanimity, sought support from a doctrine they call ‘holism in the theory of reasons.’ We argue that this is all a mistake. There are two ways in which holism in the theory of reasons can be understood, but neither p…
Constitutive Generalism
According to one dimension of the generalist tradition, moral principles are built into the very meaning of moral predicates. They are analytic truths, and thus anyone who is in fact competent with a given moral concept is (perhaps implicitly) committed to the associated principle that spells out the object to which the concept applies. On this view, certain moral principles are constitutive of moral thought and judgment; this view is called ‘con…
From Moral Knowledge to Default Principles
This chapter argues that the bare possibility of moral knowledge in particular cases is already enough to ensure the availability of a certain sort of ‘hedged’ moral principle called a ‘default principle’. Default principles are consistent with holism about reasons because they claim that a given action has a given moral property only if no further feature of the situation explains why it does not. One obvious worry about this proposal is that de…
Holism about Reasons
Particularists often try to draw support for their view from the alleged context sensitivity of reasons, and more specifically holism. According to holism about reasons, a consideration that is a reason in one context may not be similarly a reason in another context because of differences in the presence or absence of defeating and enabling conditions. This chapter distinguishes several versions of the argument from holism, and shows that despite…
Generalism as a Regulative Ideal
This chapter argues that there are reasons to try to codify the moral landscape, and that these reasons are recognizably moral. A proper understanding of the nature of historical moral progress bolsters this argument. The task of codifying morality is best understood as a collective one. Like many collective tasks, it is most efficiently pursued with a suitable division of labor. The chapter defends some of the traditional notions of moral theory…
Moral Vision
Particularism is commonly associated with a moral epistemology that takes perception as a model. This chapter argues that in so far as moral judgments are made by ‘just looking’, this does nothing to support particularism. A close examination of the role of rules and principles in chess helps make this point. Although metaphors of vision are commonplace in discussions of chess (the master ‘just sees’ that the position is weak), this rightly does …
Many Moral Particularisms
This chapter identifies moral particularism as a family of theses all of which involve some sort of negative assessment of moral principles. Family members are distinguished by the different negative attitudes taken and by different conceptions of what a moral principle is. It argues that a proper evaluation of the arguments for moral particularism must be sensitive to these distinctions.
Default Reasons
Because of its extremely ecumenical view of what considerations might count as reasons, particularism threatens to ‘flatten the moral landscape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for example pain and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid this result, particularists can try to draw a distinction between default and non-default reas…
Beyond Default Principles
This chapter argues against the hedged principles laid out in Chapter 6. It contends that the best explanation of the possibility of practical wisdom entails that morality can be codified. It gives three main arguments. The first argument contends that generalism as a regulative ideal better preserves a broad scope for practical wisdom than its particularist rivals. In pressing this argument, it is shown how generalism is better situated to accom…
Principled Guidance
Morality is a practical matter that concerns choice and action, and a sound moral outlook should be capable of motivating someone to act virtuously. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that moral principles might play an important role in guiding action. This final chapter addresses this concern, and explains how moral principles can and should play an important role in guiding action. Moral principles can help us avoid the all too human failings o…
Principled Ethics
Moral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. This book meets this particularist challenge head on and defends a distinctive view called ‘genera…
Ethics without Principles
Book Review| January 01 2007 Ethics without Principles Jonathan Dancy, Ethics without Principles. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. x + 229 pp. Michael Ridge; Michael Ridge Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Sean McKeever Sean McKeever Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (1): 124–128. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-027 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter…
Preempting Principles
Moral particularism, as recently defended, charges that traditional moral theorizing unduly privileges moral principles. Moral generalism defends a prominent place for moral principles. Because moral principles are often asked to play multiple roles, moral particularism aims at multiple targets. We distinguish two leading roles for moral principles, the role of standard and the role of guide. We critically survey some of the leading arguments bot…
Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in Ethics
People often say that some normative ethical theory, act consequentialism perhaps, faces some objection based on ‘obvious intuitions’. It is also sometimes said—e.g. by Bernard Williams—that a theory like act consequentialism can make some things too obvious; can make obvious things that aren’t obvious but deeply morally problematic and troubling even if correct. Ridge and McKeever agree that objections of Williams’ sort can sometimes have some w…
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (14 obras) · Epistemology (12 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (11 obras) · Sociology (10 obras) · Philosophy (8 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Ethics in medical practice (4 obras) · Free Will and Agency (4 obras) · Morality (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras)