James Van Cleve
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 995134 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | James Van Cleve |
| NOMBRES | James |
| APELLIDO | Van Cleve |
| FIRMA | VAN CLEVE J |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Southern California |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8627-8075 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 35 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 50 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 35 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1979 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Qua ‐Talk and Other Forms of Quackery
This is the second part of a two‐part paper, the first part having appeared in issue 11 of volume 20 of Philosophy Compass. Part One covers the use of the “ qua ” locution in connection with David Lewis, Kit Fine, and Donald Davidson. Part Two covers the use of “ qua ” in Aristotle, Spinoza, and Kant
Qua -Talk and Other Forms of Quackery
The Latin term "qua" is used occasionally in ordinary discourse but more often as a philosophical term of art. Its purpose is sometimes to avoid what would otherwise be contradictions, as in "necessarily two-legged qua cyclist, contingently two-legged qua mathematician." In this paper, I identify and clarify several of the philosophical uses of "qua," approving some and criticizing others. I discuss the use of "qua" in connection with six differe…
Logicism and Formal Necessity
Logicism is Stang’s name for the Leibnizian doctrine that all necessary truths are derivable from identities and definitions. Stang shows that the early Kant opposed this doctrine because he thought the proposition God exists was a counterexample to it; I raise some non-theological counterexamples as well. Formal necessity is the necessity that attaches to a proposition when its truth is grounded in our categories and forms of intuition. Stang tr…
Brute necessity
In a growing number of papers, one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. That is, they imply that there are propositions p such that (a) it is necessary that p, but (b) there is no explanation why it is necessary that p. For short, they imply that there are "brute necessities." Therefore, the argume…
Objectivity without objects
Précis of Problems from Reid
Replies to Falkenstein, Copenhaver, and Winkler
Problems from Reid
A contemporary of Hume, Thomas Reid is especially known today for his opposition to skepticism and "the way of ideas" (the notion that what the mind perceives is not objective reality, but simply an internal image). Reid was one of the first to question this view, which is still prevalent today, and pointed out some of the negative consequences to which it leads. For the growing recognition about these and other contributions in epistemology, the…
Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States
Can Coherence Generate Warrant Ex Nihilo ? Probability and the Logic of Concurring Witnesses
Most foundationalists allow that relations of coherence among antecedently justified beliefs can enhance their overall level of justification or warrant. In light of this, some coherentists ask the following question: if coherence can elevate the epistemic status of a set of beliefs, what prevents it from generating warrant entirely on its own? Why do we need the foundationalist’s basic beliefs? I address that question here, drawing lessons from …
Matter, Space and Quality
Double Appearances Are Double Trouble
Reid on Single and Double Vision
When we look at a tree, two images of it are formed, one on each of our retinas. Why, then, asks the child or the philosopher, do we not see two trees? 1 Thomas Reid offers an answer to this question in the section of his Inquiry into the Human Mind entitled ‘Of seeing objects single with two eyes’. The principles he invokes in his answer serve at the same time to explain why we do occasionally see objects double. In Part I of this essay, I exami…
Précis of Problems from Kant
Replies
Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles
Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles
Research Article| July 01 2002 Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles James Van Cleve James Van Cleve Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 373–416. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-3-373 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation James Van Cleve; Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2002; 111 (3): 37…
Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties
Problems from Kant
Universals and Property Instances
Preface. Glossary of Special Symbols. Part I: Tropes, Universals and Individuals: 1. Tropes and Their Uses. 2. Other Tropes? 3. Metaphysical Construction. Universals. 5. Individuals. Part II: Relational Tropes and Individuals: 1. Relations of Individuals in Trope Theory. 2. Bundles of Polytropes. 3. Representatives instead of Bundles. Part III: Compound Universals, Wholes, and States of Affairs: 1. Compound Properties. 2. Compound Universals. 3. …
Universals and Property Instances
Book Review| January 01 2000 Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being UNIVERSALS AND PROPERTY INSTANCES: THE ALPHABET OF BEING. By John Bacon. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. Pp. iv, 159. James Van Cleve James Van Cleve Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 107–109. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-1-107 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Perm…
Problems from Kant
In this work, James Van Cleve examines the main topics from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Among the topics discussed in detail are Kant's transcendental idealism, necessity and analyticity, space and time, substance and cause, noumena and things-in-themselves, problems of the self, and rational theology. In a concluding chapter, Van Cleve relates Kant's thought to modern anti-realist approaches, in particular, the work of Putnam and Dummett. Th…
Epistemic Supervenience Revisited
Minimal Truth Is Realist Truth
If Meinong Is Wrong, Is McTaggart Right
Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism
In this paper I wish to consider the merits of Realist theories of predication vis-a-vis three varieties of Nominalism, which Armstrong has dubbed Predicate Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism, and Ostrich Nominalism.' In Part I, I shall argue that Ostrich Nominalism is the most satisfactory position of these four, and that the Realist view favored by Armstrong and many others is prone to the same fundamental difficulty as the other two varieties …
Mind--Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence
1. Human beings are complex systems composed entirely of matter. (Material Composition, or Anti-Dualism)3 2. Mental properties are not logically implied by any physical properties. (Anti-Reductivism) 3. Human beings do have mental properties. (Anti-Eliminativism) 4. There are no emergent properties. That is to say, all properties of a complex system that are not relations between it and something else derive from the properties of its constituent…
Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle
T HE problem of the Cartesian Circle is sometimes treated as though it were merely an exercise for scholars: Descartes fell into it, and theirjob is to get him out of it. But more is at stake than extricating Descartes. In its generalized form, the Cartesian Circle is none other than the Problem of the Criterion, a problem that any epistemology must face. Moreover, to solve the problem of the Circle one must answer questions about epistemic princ…
Right, Left, and the Fourth Dimension
Can Coherence Generate Warrant Ex Nihilo ? Probability and the Logic of Concurring Witnesses
Most foundationalists allow that relations of coherence among antecedently justified beliefs can enhance their overall level of justification or warrant. In light of this, some coherentists ask the following question: if coherence can elevate the epistemic status of a set of beliefs, what prevents it from generating warrant entirely on its own? Why do we need the foundationalist’s basic beliefs? I address that question here, drawing lessons from …
Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles
Research Article| July 01 2002 Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles James Van Cleve James Van Cleve Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 373–416. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-3-373 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation James Van Cleve; Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2002; 111 (3): 37…
Brute necessity
In a growing number of papers, one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. That is, they imply that there are propositions p such that (a) it is necessary that p, but (b) there is no explanation why it is necessary that p. For short, they imply that there are "brute necessities." Therefore, the argume…
If Meinong Is Wrong, Is McTaggart Right
Objectivity without objects
Defining and Defending Nonconceptual Contents and States
Reid on Single and Double Vision
When we look at a tree, two images of it are formed, one on each of our retinas. Why, then, asks the child or the philosopher, do we not see two trees? 1 Thomas Reid offers an answer to this question in the section of his Inquiry into the Human Mind entitled ‘Of seeing objects single with two eyes’. The principles he invokes in his answer serve at the same time to explain why we do occasionally see objects double. In Part I of this essay, I exami…
Précis of Problems from Kant
Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles
Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties
Minimal Truth Is Realist Truth
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge
Reflections on Kant's second antimony
Substance, Matter, and Kant’s First Analogy
Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle
T HE problem of the Cartesian Circle is sometimes treated as though it were merely an exercise for scholars: Descartes fell into it, and theirjob is to get him out of it. But more is at stake than extricating Descartes. In its generalized form, the Cartesian Circle is none other than the Problem of the Criterion, a problem that any epistemology must face. Moreover, to solve the problem of the Circle one must answer questions about epistemic princ…
Substance, Matter, and Kant’s First Analogy
Reflections on Kant's second antimony
C. I. Lewis' Defense of Phenomenalism
Right, Left, and the Fourth Dimension
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge
Mind--Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence
1. Human beings are complex systems composed entirely of matter. (Material Composition, or Anti-Dualism)3 2. Mental properties are not logically implied by any physical properties. (Anti-Reductivism) 3. Human beings do have mental properties. (Anti-Eliminativism) 4. There are no emergent properties. That is to say, all properties of a complex system that are not relations between it and something else derive from the properties of its constituent…
Conditions of Identity
This book sets out a new theory of the unity of objects. The author introduces the reader to the central problems faced by philosophical accounts of identity, problems which can, to a large extent, be solved using the theory developed in the book. In his consideration of the vexed issue of personal identity, the author argues that in our everyday thinking about persons we merge radically different kinds of notions. He suggests that our assessment…
Descartes and the Destruction of the Eternal Truths
Descartes's view that the eternal truths of mathematics and logic have been established by God and depend on his will does not merely commit him (as some commentators have suggested) to denying that such truths are necessarily necessary; it abolishes their necessity altogether. For similar reasons, some contemporary views also unwittingly abolish necessity.
Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism
In this paper I wish to consider the merits of Realist theories of predication vis-a-vis three varieties of Nominalism, which Armstrong has dubbed Predicate Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism, and Ostrich Nominalism.' In Part I, I shall argue that Ostrich Nominalism is the most satisfactory position of these four, and that the Realist view favored by Armstrong and many others is prone to the same fundamental difficulty as the other two varieties …
Minimal Truth Is Realist Truth
If Meinong Is Wrong, Is McTaggart Right
Problems from Kant
In this work, James Van Cleve examines the main topics from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Among the topics discussed in detail are Kant's transcendental idealism, necessity and analyticity, space and time, substance and cause, noumena and things-in-themselves, problems of the self, and rational theology. In a concluding chapter, Van Cleve relates Kant's thought to modern anti-realist approaches, in particular, the work of Putnam and Dummett. Th…
Epistemic Supervenience Revisited
Universals and Property Instances
Preface. Glossary of Special Symbols. Part I: Tropes, Universals and Individuals: 1. Tropes and Their Uses. 2. Other Tropes? 3. Metaphysical Construction. Universals. 5. Individuals. Part II: Relational Tropes and Individuals: 1. Relations of Individuals in Trope Theory. 2. Bundles of Polytropes. 3. Representatives instead of Bundles. Part III: Compound Universals, Wholes, and States of Affairs: 1. Compound Properties. 2. Compound Universals. 3. …
Universals and Property Instances
Book Review| January 01 2000 Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being UNIVERSALS AND PROPERTY INSTANCES: THE ALPHABET OF BEING. By John Bacon. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. Pp. iv, 159. James Van Cleve James Van Cleve Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (1): 107–109. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-1-107 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Perm…
Problems from Kant
Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles
Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles
Research Article| July 01 2002 Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles James Van Cleve James Van Cleve Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (3): 373–416. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-3-373 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation James Van Cleve; Thomas Reid's Geometry of Visibles. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2002; 111 (3): 37…
Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties
Précis of Problems from Kant
Replies
Double Appearances Are Double Trouble
Reid on Single and Double Vision
When we look at a tree, two images of it are formed, one on each of our retinas. Why, then, asks the child or the philosopher, do we not see two trees? 1 Thomas Reid offers an answer to this question in the section of his Inquiry into the Human Mind entitled ‘Of seeing objects single with two eyes’. The principles he invokes in his answer serve at the same time to explain why we do occasionally see objects double. In Part I of this essay, I exami…
Matter, Space and Quality
Philosophy (29 obras) · Epistemology (25 obras) · Philosophy (17 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (16 obras) · Computer Science (12 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (11 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (10 obras) · Citation (9 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (7 obras) · Library science (7 obras)