Sinan Dogramaci
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 996156 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Sinan Dogramaci |
| NOMBRES | Sinan |
| APELLIDO | Dogramaci |
| FIRMA | DOGRAMACI S |
| AFILIACIONES | The University of Texas at Austin |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 5 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 5 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2012 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Why I Am Not a Boltzmann Brain
This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications
Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective
If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement is thus a kind of moral lottery, to adapt a similar metaphor from Sharon Street. Her own genealogical debunking argument, as I discuss, relies on a p…
Representation and rationality
David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis's project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated deve…
Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference
True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases . This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different defi…
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations
Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference
True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases . This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different defi…
Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations
Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference
True beliefs and truth‐preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth‐preserving, but truth‐preserving in all cases . This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different defi…
Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective
If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement is thus a kind of moral lottery, to adapt a similar metaphor from Sharon Street. Her own genealogical debunking argument, as I discuss, relies on a p…
Representation and rationality
David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis's project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated deve…
Why I Am Not a Boltzmann Brain
This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications
Philosophy (5 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Epistemology (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 obras) · Linguistics (2 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 obras)