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Behavioral Differences between Structures with Rank-Order Equivalence

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10071517
AutoresJames A Schellenberg (Indiana State University, autor de correspondencia)
Año1985
Volumen29
Número3
Páginas531-542
Fecha de publicación1985-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022002785029003007
OpenAlexW2132271042
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas15

Primitive measures of utility—identified simply as positive (+), neutral (0), or negative (-)—were used in experimental work to show important differences in two-person co-operation between different structures, even though these structures have an identical rank-ordering of possible choices. Interpersonal comparisons and considerations of equity appear to account for the differences in results. It is suggested that further experimental use of primitive measures might be helpful in clarifying how interpersonal comparisons may affect emergent processes of cooperation in two-party situations

Affect (linguistics · Cognitive psychology · Combinatorics · Economics · Equity (law · Equivalence (formal languages · Interpersonal communication · Interpersonal relationship · Order (exchange · Political science · Pure mathematics · Rank (graph theory · Communication · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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Obras citantes distintas1
Citas por año0,07
Intervalo de citas2012 - 2012 (1)
Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 1
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