Tacit Bargaining in International Relations
A Game Model and a Case Study
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10071818 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Catherine C Langlois (Georgetown University), Jean-Pierre P Langlois (San Francisco State University) |
| Año | 1996 |
| Volumen | 40 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 569-596 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1996-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002796040004003 |
| OpenAlex | W2094772993 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 26 |
The authors develop a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in discounted repeated games that highlights a class of strategies called countervailing. When using countervailing strategies, the players focus on manipulating the other side's payoff to induce his cooperation. These strategies do not require one player to entertain specific expectations about the strategic choice of the other. For this reason, countervailing strategies are promising vehicles for tacit bargaining. The authors test their relevance using a case of international trade—Japan's penetration of the U.S. automobile market in the early 1980s. The empirical section provides evidence of the tacit bargaining behavior that the model predicts
Bargaining power · Economics · Game theory · Knowledge management · Microeconomics · Political science · Relevance (law · Stochastic game · Subgame perfect equilibrium · Tacit collusion · Tacit knowledge · Test (biology · Computer Science · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis
Beyond Mass Production
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Spurious regressions in econometrics
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Some properties of time series data and their use in econometric model specification
The Bargaining Problem
The new protectionist threat to world welfare
Restraining Auto Imports
Arms races as iterated prisoner's dilemma games
Beyond Mass Production
Rationality in International Relations
Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability
Stability in Richardson's Arms Races and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Arms Rivalries
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve
Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,08 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2001 - 2022 (22) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |