Reasons to Reject Allowing
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10346309 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2003 |
| Volumen | 66 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 169-175 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2003-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00251.x |
| OpenAlex | W2048939888 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
The morality of what we owe to each other is a matter of principles that no one could reasonably reject-if we were all concerned to agree on what sort of conduct to allow or disallow.We care about it deeply, because we want to be able to justify what we do to others on a basis that they could not reasonably reject.I find this an immensely appealing moral ideal, and find Scanlon's explanation of its appeal plausible and illuminating.What We Owe to Each Other is a wonderful book full of deep and extended argument.No brief exploration could begin to do it justice, but I will touch on a few questions the book raises for me.' I treat the concept of a reason in Wise Choices, Apr Feelings (1990).pp.160-164.To call R a reason to do X, I say, is to express one's "acceptance of norms that say to treat R as weighing in favor of doing x"' (163).Scanlon discusses this (58): Nonnative reasons are beliefs, he maintains, and I am now happy to agree.Scanlon worries that to explain the concept of a reason, I appeal, in effect, to his own, normative notion of "counting in favor".But I
Citation · Epistemology · Library science · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,06 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2008 - 2008 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |