Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10346556
AutoresFiona Macpherson (0000-0002-4950-3309, University of Glasgow, autor de correspondencia)
Año2005
Volumen70
Número1
Páginas127-152
Fecha de publicación2005-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00508.x
OpenAlexW2076669330
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas18

In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional externalist views about the nature of the content of prepositional attitudes. Thus, colour inversion scenarios are more damaging to externalist representationalist views than have been previously thought. More specifically, I argue that representationalists who endorse externalism about experiential content either have to become internalists about the content of prepositional attitudes or they have to adopt a novel variety of externalism about the content of prepositional attitudes. This novel type of prepositional attitude externalism is investigated. It can be seen that adopting it forces one to reject Putnam's and Burge's externalist considerations about the nature of the prepositional attitudes

Consciousness · Content (measure theory · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Experiential learning · Externalism · Internalism and externalism · Perception · Qualia · Variety (cybernetics · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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