From Friendship to Marriage

Revising Kant

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10348752
AutoresLara Denis (University of California, Irvine, autor de correspondencia)
Año2001
Volumen63
Número1
Páginas1-28
Fecha de publicación2001-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00090.x
OpenAlexW2048798212
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas19

This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of "moral marriage" based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong-headed. The paper further argues that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ

Epistemology · Friendship · Ideal (ethics · Social science · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Global History, Politics, and Ideology · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychoanalysis and Social Critique · Psychology · Social Psychology