Basic‐Know And Super‐Know
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10349371 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Anna Mahtani (0000-0003-1581-4325, London School of Economics and Political Science, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 98 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 375-391 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-10-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12452 |
| OpenAlex | W2625271349 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 28 |
Sometimes a proposition is ‘opaque’ to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the ‘Opaque Proposition Principle’. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: the term ‘know’ as it appears in the principle can be interpreted in two different ways, as either basic‐know or super‐know. I use this distinction to construct a plausible version of the principle, and then to similarly construct plausible versions of the Reflection Principle and the Sure‐Thing Principle
Construct (python library · Credence · Epistemology · Function (biology · Need to know · Proposition · Term (time · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |