Intentionality and the Non-Psychological

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10350066
AutoresCastellón Martín, C B Martin, Karen Pfeifer (0000-0001-8059-6008), Karl Pfeifer
Año1986
Volumen46
Número4
Páginas531-531
Fecha de publicación1986-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2107668
OpenAlexW2033639378
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas18

We will show that the most typical characterizations' of intentionality, including those discussed by W. Lycan in his article On 'Intentionality' and the Psychological,' and also Lycan's own suggested characterization and John R. Searle's more extended treatments of the concept all fail to distinguish intentional mental states from non-intentional dispositional physical states. Accepting any of these current accounts will be to take a quick road to panpsychism! The cases and arguments we develop are not meant merely to show up errors and inadequacies but are meant to show in detail how the persistent and widespread failure to distinguish between intentionality and non-intentional causal dispositionality has compromised much recent work (including that of Searle's) on intentionality. The clear need to make such a distinction should provide a direction for future work on the subject

Analytic philosophy · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Intentionality · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment