Introducing Recursive Consequentialism
A Modified Version of Cooperative Utilitarianism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10690077 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Evan G Williams (0000-0002-0072-3060, University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 67 |
| Número | 269 |
| Páginas | 794-812 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqx018 |
| OpenAlex | W2605267942 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 7 |
This article proposes ‘Recursive Consequentialism’: the moral theory which gives agents whatever advice will produce good consequences by being given. It can be thought of as a version of Donald Regan's ‘Cooperative Utilitarianism’ to which two additional elements have been added: allowing people with differing conceptions of ‘good consequences’, e.g., a Utilitarian and a non-Utilitarian, to cooperate with one another, and taking into account the full consequences of accepting, not just complying with, moral guidance. The theory is motivated by a series of game-theoretic examples in which adherence to alternative Consequentialist moral theories produces bad consequences.
Consequentialism · Deontological ethics · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Positive economics · Sociology · Utilitarianism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |