Knowing-Attributions as Endorsements

In saying ‘N knows that p’, where the supposed knowing is gained through rational reflection (the paradigm form of knowing, conceptually), I endorse N’s belief as rationally held, and hence correct (the ‘RhCB’ analysis). We understand this ‘hence’ not as ‘hence, infallibly’ but as ‘hence in fact’– a reliability reading, not implying infallibility (cf. the use of ‘hence’ to attribute non‐deterministic causation). The false appearance of inconsistency in our taking knowing to require an infallible guarantee of correctness while regularly attributing knowledge where we lack an absolute guarantee arises from misreading of the ‘hence’ as implying infallibility, partly due to the mistaken assumption that ‘know’ functions purely descriptively. Though aware that rationality may occasionally fail to ensure correctness, we accept it as sufficing to yield knowledge wherever it does not fail – a consistent non‐infallibilist understanding of what knowing requires

Algorithm · Attribution · Causation · Correctness · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Infallibility · Linguistics · Rationality · Reading (process) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

• How the Laws of Physics Lie

  Nancy Cartwright•How the laws of physics lie•1983

  Añadir item

• Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

  Edmund L Gettier•Analysis•1963

  Añadir item

• Ascriptivism

  P T Geach•The Philosophical Review•1960

  Añadir item

• Meaning and Speech Acts

  R M Hare•The Philosophical Review•1970

  Añadir item

• Performance and Promise

  Austin Duncan-Jones, Austin Duncan‐Jones•The Philosophical Quarterly•1964

  Añadir item