Visual attention and representational content

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10690414
AutoresKim Soland (0000-0002-2333-9643, University of Kansas, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Fecha de publicación2025-01-10
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae152
OpenAlexW4406289438
IdiomaIT
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas28

Attention makes a phenomenal difference to visual experience, but the nature of this difference is controversial. There are three possibilities. The first is that the phenomenology of visual attention has deflationary content, which is to say that attention makes a phenomenal difference only by modulating the appearance of an attended object's visible features. Secondly, it has novel content—attention contributes unique representational content to visual experience. Thirdly, it has no content—the phenomenal contribution of attention to visual experience is not representational at all. I argue that problems for deflationary content and no content accounts motivate a novel content account of visual attentional phenomenology. I develop a novel content account which avoids challenges that have hitherto been presumed devastating for such views. The resulting theory vindicates representationalism about visual experience and is poised to do the same for experiences in other perceptual modalities

Cognitive psychology · Content (measure theory) · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Inattentional blindness · Linguistics · Modalities · Object (grammar) · Perception · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Social science · Sociology · Visual attention · Visual perception · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms