Do Constancy Mechanisms Save Distal Content

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691047
AutoresJustin Garson (0000-0002-0210-2989, Hunter College of the City, University of New York, USA, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen69
Número275
Páginas409-417
Fecha de publicación2019-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqy032
OpenAlexW2913949779
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas11

In this journal, Schulte develops a novel solution to the problem of distal content: by virtue of what is a mental representation about a distal object (say, a snake) rather than a more proximal cause of that representation (say, a snake-shaped retinal impression)? Schulte maintains that in order for a (sensory-perceptual) representation to have a distal content, it must be produced by a constancy mechanism, along with two other conditions. I raise three objections to his solution. First, a core component of Schulte's solution is just a restrictive version of Dretske's solution, but Schulte gives no argument for his restriction. Second, his proposed solution to a disjunction problem (his ‘naturalness’ condition) is ad hoc. Finally, his ‘far-out’ version of the distality problem is not a version of the distality problem at all. I conclude that Dretske's solution is preferable to Schulte's.

Argument (complex analysis) · Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Naturalness · Object (grammar) · Perception · Physics · Representation (politics) · Virtue · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Visual perception and processing mechanisms