The Aim of Belief

Does belief aim at truth, or rather at knowledge? If it aims at truth, then what is the relationship between justification, knowledge, and the aim of belief? Are there non-evidential reasons to believe? Can beliefs be formed at will? If there are any distinctive belief-truth norms, then is belief constituted by such norms? These are just five of the questions at the core of discussion in ‘The Aim of Belief’, edited by Timothy Chan. In what follows I will be guided by these questions, taking them in the order given. The book collects eleven new essays, including an introduction, from leading theorists in the field. Chan's introduction is a very helpful contribution. He clearly and comprehensively connects many of the volume's questions to the most important discussions in the extant literature. In ch. 10, ‘Nothing but the Truth’, Daniel Whiting considers and rejects the view—recently becoming more popular—that it is knowledge, not truth, that provides the standard for believing. He responds to arguments that one may believe that p only if one knows that p, and maintains the position that the truth of p is sufficient for the permissibility of believing p. According to Whiting, ‘knowledge, in general, is not the norm for belief—truth is (or so I believe).’ (p. 202).

Cognition · Epistemology · Extant taxon · False belief · Norm (philosophy) · Nothing · Order (exchange) · Theory of mind · Whiting · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology