Lewis' Strawman
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10691463 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Eric Margolis (0000-0001-5145-8976, Rice University), Sophie Laurence (0000-0001-6464-4620, University of Sheffield), Stephen Laurence |
| Año | 2002 |
| Volumen | 52 |
| Número | 206 |
| Páginas | 55-65 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2002-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00252 |
| OpenAlex | W4240240147 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 8 |
In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, ‘Strawman’. His case against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. The theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk‐psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond to Lewis, arguing (amongst other things) that he underestimates Strawman’s theoretical resources in a variety of important ways
Epistemology · Field (mathematics) · Rationality · Relation (database) · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Altamente citado | No |
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