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Relevance and Verification

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691528
AutoresBen Blumson (0000-0002-2469-3150, National University of Singapore, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen71
Número3
Páginas457-480
Fecha de publicación2021-06-17
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaa071
OpenAlexW3096555107
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas37

A. J. Ayer’s empiricist criterion of meaning was supposed to have sorted all statements into nonsense on the one hand, and tautologies or genuinely factual statements on the other. Unfortunately for Ayer, it follows from classical logic that his criterion is trivial—it classifies all statements as either tautologies or genuinely factual, but none as nonsense. However, in this paper, I argue that Ayer’s criterion of meaning can be defended from classical proofs of its triviality by the adoption of a relevant logic—an idea which is motivated because, according to Ayer, the genuinely factual statements are those which observation is relevant to

Empiricism · Epistemology · Mathematical proof · Meaning (existential) · Nonsense · Political science · Pure mathematics · Relevance (law) · Sequent calculus · Triviality · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History

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    A J Ayer•Language, truth and logic•1990

  • Relevant Logic

    Open Access•Edwin Mares, Edwin D Mares•Relevant Logic•2004

  • An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic

    Open Access•Graham Priest•Introduction to Non-Classical Logic•2008

  • Relevant implication

    Open Access•David Lewis•Theoria•1988

  • The logic of paradox

    Open Access•Graham Priest•Journal of Philosophical Logic•1979

  • Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics

    Open Access•Darren Bradley•Synthese•2018

  • Empirical significance, predictive power, and explication

    Open Access•Jonathan Surovell•Synthese•2019

  • Testability and Meaning

    Open Access•Rudolf Carnap•Philosophy of Science•1936

  • Postulates and Meaning

    Open Access•Edward H Madden, Murray Kiteley et al.•Philosophy of Science•1962

  • Meaning and Verification

    Moritz Schlick•The Philosophical Review•1936

  • The Anatomy of Enquiry

    L Jonathan Cohen, Larry Cohen et al.•The Philosophical Quarterly•1965

Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
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