Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691628
AutoresJamin Asay (0000-0003-1972-0035, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong), Sherry Baron (0000-0003-4000-3276, The University of Western Australia), Sam Baron (The University of Western Australia)
Año2019
Fecha de publicación2019-07-22
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqz036
OpenAlexW2962888432
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas43

In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigation—hence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationists’ agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap

Analogy · Deflation · Economics · Epistemology · Keynesian economics · Mathematical economics · Monetary policy · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History