The Doomsday Argument and the Self-Indication Assumption

Reply to Olum

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691632
AutoresNick Bostrom (University of Oxford), Milan M Cirkovic (0000-0002-6634-1321, Astronomical Observatory)
Año2003
Volumen53
Número210
Páginas83-91
Fecha de publicación2003-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00298
OpenAlexW2171639449
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas8

In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argument (or the other counter-intuitive results that flow from related thought-experiments). A developed theory of observation selection effects shows why the doomsday argument is inconclusive, and how one can consistently reject both it and (SIA)

Argument (complex analysis) · Internal Medicine · Medicine · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life