Content and the Fittingness of Emotion

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691706
AutoresBrian Scott Ballard (University of Pittsburgh), Brian Ballard (0000-0003-3509-4396, University of Pittsburgh, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen71
Número4
Fecha de publicación2021-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaa074
OpenAlexW3110183413
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas33

Many philosophers of emotion, whether perceptual or cognitive theorists, have claimed that emotions represent evaluative properties. This is often supported by an appeal to the fittingness of emotion: that emotions can be fitting shows they represent evaluative properties. In this paper, however, I argue that this inference is much too fast. In fact, no aspect of the rational assessment of emotion directly supports the claim that emotions represent evaluative properties. This inference can, however, be matured into an inference to the best explanation. But this requires coming to terms with a significant emerging rival, the attitudinal theory of emotion. In this paper, I show how this can be accomplished and the inference from fittingness to content saved

Appeal · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Inference · Perception · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology