Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691832
AutoresAnn Jefferson (0000-0002-1870-1361, Cardiff University, autor de correspondencia), Anneli Jefferson (Cardiff University)
Año2020
Volumen70
Número281
Páginas868-870
Fecha de publicación2020-09-17
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoREVIEW
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqz082
OpenAlexW2996871743
IdiomaEN

How and when we blame and punish, praise and reward each other is clearly of immense practical importance. But there has also been increased theoretical interest in how our practices can explain the concept of moral responsibility itself since P.F. Strawson claimed that focusing on the reactive attitudes gives us a notion of moral responsibility that is independent of the stance we take on the metaphysics of free will. Recently, philosophers like Victoria McGeer and Manuel Vargas have also drawn attention to the way responsible agency is supported through our practices. Hutchison, Mackenzie and Oshana’s volume on the social dimensions of moral responsibility brings together papers that draw on this work and address the question of how the fact that the social environment in which people hold each other responsible is characterised by oppression, prejudice, and implicit or explicit bias affects agents’ moral responsibility and the justification of our practices.

Agency (philosophy) · Blame · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Moral agency · Moral disengagement · Moral responsibility · Oppression · Political science · Politics · Praise · Prejudice (legal term) · Social cognitive theory of morality · Social responsibility · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology