The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691882
AutoresFinnur Dellsén (0000-0003-4989-4204, University College Dublin, autor de correspondencia)
Año2016
Páginaspqw069
Fecha de publicación2016-10-28
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqw069
OpenAlexW2545352171
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas3

Suppose you and I are equally well informed on some factual issue and equally competent in forming beliefs on the basis of the information we possess. Having evaluated this information, each of us independently forms a belief on the issue. However, since neither of us is infallible, we may end up with contrary beliefs. How should I react if I discover that we disagree in this way? According to conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreement, I should modify my original opinion by moving closer to your opinion. According to steadfast views, I should not. In the past decade or so, this issue has been addressed in hundreds of journal articles and a number of edited collections. The literature has grown so fast that it has become hard to keep up with even just the major developments. In The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, Jonathan Matheson has provided us with an excellent overview of some of the most prominent positions and arguments in the literature so far. Matheson's discussion is clear and organized thematically in a way that makes it well suited as an introductory text on the epistemology of disagreement.

Epistemology · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy