The Simulation Argument
Reply to Weatherson
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10691942 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Nick Bostrom (University of Oxford, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2005 |
| Volumen | 55 |
| Número | 218 |
| Páginas | 90-97 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2005-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00387.x |
| OpenAlex | W1982713512 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 5 |
| Referencias citadas | 2 |
I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my ‘simulation argument’. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on ‘grue’-like predicates
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Externalism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,83 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 5 |