Targeting Human Shields

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10691982
AutoresAmir Saemi (0000-0003-0771-0534, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Iran), Philip Atkins (0000-0003-1478-4515, Temple University)
Año2018
Volumen68
Número271
Páginas328-348
Fecha de publicación2018-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqx049
OpenAlexW2756760523
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas16

In this paper, we are concerned with the morality of killing human shields. Many moral philosophers seem to believe that knowingly killing human shields necessarily involves intentionally targeting human shields. If we assume that the distinction between intention and foresight is morally significant, then this view would entail that it is generally harder to justify a military operation in which human shields are knowingly killed than a military operation in which the same number of casualties result as a merely foreseen side effect. We argue, however, that only some cases of knowingly killing human shields should be regarded as intentionally targeting human shields, and thus only those cases face higher bars of justification. We shall formulate different principles that help us to distinguish between cases where a military operation involves the deliberate harming of human shields and cases where it does not. As we shall see, these principles are relevant in scenarios that are all too realistic and common, such as the bombing of legitimate military targets located amid civilian populations.

Epistemology · Futures studies · Morality · Physics · Political science · Shields · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification