The Future of the Philosophy of Time
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10692050 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Dana Goswick (The University of Melbourne, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2015 |
| Volumen | 65 |
| Número | 261 |
| Páginas | 851-853 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2015-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqv028 |
| OpenAlex | W2332784711 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 5 |
Adrian Bardon's anthology can be divided into three sections: articles concerned with methodology in the philosophy of time, articles concerned with time's passage, and articles which address assorted topics within the philosophy of time. Callender's ‘Time's Ontic Voltage’ and Dyke's ‘On Methodology in the Metaphysics of Time’ are both centrally concerned with methodology. Callender argues that any view of time which is defined in terms of how much time exists (as Presentism, Growing Block, and Eternalism all are) can't explain the temporal data, i.e., can't explain (i) why we think and act as if there's a global common now, (ii) why we believe time has a direction, and (iii) why we believe time flows. Underlying Callender's argument is the assumption that the mere existence of something makes no difference to our experience of it. This assumption, as well as the claim that there's a mismatch between what the central views in the philosophy of time explain and what we're interested in having explained, warrants further investigation. Dyke argues that both A-theorists and B-theorists have bought into a methodology which is a poor methodology for learning about time. This methodology is characterized by the following three attitudes: (1) A-theory is the default view, the burden of proof lies with B-theory, (2) common sense intuitions about time carry weight, and (3) ordinary language usage carries weight. Dyke argues that, if we pay close attention to our goal, which is to explain the mind-independent fundamental nature of time, we'll see that the standard methodology doesn't facilitate achieving this goal. If our goal is the discovery of truth about the mind-independent world, the burden of proof is equal and intuitions and language only carry weight if we have some reason to believe they're truth tracking. Given the evolutionary origins of language and the variability of intuitions, we have no reason to think this. It's an interesting feature of the debate in philosophy of time, which Dyke points out, that B-theorists have generally accepted a methodology which favours A-theory. Both Dyke and Callender give us reason to seriously reconsider our methodological approach. Is there any connection between what the standard views of time explain and what we antecedently want to have explained? Rather than following the standard methodology, should B-theorists instead argue the standard methodology is flawed and show that, given the proper, scientific, methodology, the default view is B-theory?
Argument (complex analysis) · B-theory of time · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Ontic · Ordinary language philosophy · Philosophy of space and time · Presentism · Western philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,56 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |