Consent theory as hermeneutical injustice

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10692206
AutoresJonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)
Año2025
Volumen75
Número4
Páginas1344-1365
Fecha de publicación2025-10-15
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaf033
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas39

I describe respects in which an overemphasis on the role of consent in sexual ethics gives rise to hermeneutical injustices. Although consent is widely invoked with feminist motivations to combat rape culture, the role to which it is often put, I argue, is often antithetical to its laudable feminist aims. Various influential stereotypes about consent and sex influence the public imagination, interacting to produce and reinforce harmful ‘inference tickets’ that impede public and individual understanding of important positive and negative kinds of sexual interactions. Rather than trying to replace inadequate conceptions of consent with more inflationary ones, I suggest that feminists should use different language and frameworks to express their critiques and motivate positive cultural change