A responsibilist account of knowledge

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10692225
AutoresXINGMING HU (0000-0002-6967-2177, Nanjing University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Fecha de publicación2025-05-07
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaf041
OpenAlexW4410139548
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas31

This paper argues for a responsibilist account of knowledge: S knows that p iff S believes the truth that p (rather than one of the alternatives to p) because S forms/retains the belief in a way that is ultima facie epistemically responsible. This account implies that knowing that p requires neither having evidence that favors p over ∼p, nor possessing reliabilist virtues, nor exhibiting responsibilist virtues or motives

Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science