The Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility and Mckenna's Interdependence Thesis

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10692302
AutoresPaul Manata (0000-0002-4535-1125, Calvin University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen67
Número266
Páginas61-83
Fecha de publicación2017-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqw035
OpenAlexW2563791560
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas29

Moral responsibility theorists divide over whether facts about holding someone morally responsible are dependent on facts about being morally responsible, or whether the dependence relation runs in the other direction. A novel answer, proposed by Michael McKenna, is that neither side depends on the other. Instead, they are interdependent. Call this the ‘interdependence thesis’. A worry is that the interdependence thesis violates formal principles of metaphysical dependence in terms of ground. This paper analyses and defends the interdependence thesis, interacting with recent work in the metaphysics of grounding. I vindicate the interdependence thesis from the charge that it violates the formal principles of metaphysical grounding. I then pull from recent work in communication theory and apply it to McKenna's ‘conversational theory of moral responsibility’, in order to respond to two new objections. One upshot is that I advance the conversational theory of moral responsibility.

Epistemology · Moral responsibility · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification