Reid's Regress

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10692315
AutoresTerence Cuneo (0000-0002-9850-5490, University of Vermont), Randall Harp (0000-0001-7278-3292, University of Vermont)
Año2019
Volumen69
Número277
Páginas678-698
Fecha de publicación2019-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqz027
OpenAlexW2950883790
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas14

Thomas Reid's Essays on the Active Powers presents what is probably the most thoroughly developed version of agent-causal libertarianism in the modern canon. While commentators today often acknowledge Reid's contribution, they typically focus on what appears to be a serious problem for the view: Reid appears to commit himself to a position according to which acting freely would require an agent to engage in an infinite number of exertions of active power. In this essay, we maintain that, properly understood, Reid's version of agent-causal libertarianism generates no regress of exertion. Our discussion begins by presenting Reid's account of free action and why it appears vulnerable to a worrisome regress. We then consider three attempts to address the regress in the contemporary literature offered by William Rowe, Gideon Yaffe, and James Van Cleve, which we find unsatisfactory. We then develop a solution to the worry—one that takes very seriously both what Reid means by an ‘efficient’ cause and his appeal to normative features when explaining action. We call it the ‘networked capacity’ view

Action (physics) · Appeal · Commit · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Libertarianism · Normative · Political science · Power (physics) · ROWE · Sociology · Worry · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology