The Conditional Fallacy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10692829
AutoresDaniel Bonevac (0000-0001-8666-1771), Josh Dever, David Sosa
Año2006
Volumen115
Número3
Páginas273-316
Fecha de publicación2006-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-2006-001
OpenAlexW1998372779
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas16

∗ We are grateful to Michael Fara for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. † The authors ’ names are listed in alphabetical order. c © 2006 conditionalfallacyphilreview.tex; 31/07/2006; 14:12; p.1 The thought that dispositional properties can be understood in terms of the holding of certain counterfactuals goes back at least to Ryle1: To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds per-tinently in French, acts appropriately or translates correctly into his own tongue. (Ryle (1949), 123) This project of conditional analysis of dispositions faces considerable diffi-culties in refining the rather crude conditional connections that first come to mind.2 A more recent line of discussion, however, has suggested that there are general arguments against “any attempt to account for dispositions that makes essential use of strong conditionals and counterfactuals ” (Martin (1994), 7-8). This line, which begins with Shope (1978), and runs through Johnston

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