Descartes's Proof that his Essence is Thinking

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10692889
AutoresNorman Malcolm (autor de correspondencia)
Año1965
Volumen74
Número3
Páginas315
Fecha de publicación1965-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2183357
OpenAlexW2333014262
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4

I. Q UM RES COGITANS. It is not difficult to understand K Descartes's conviction that by means of his first principle, cogito ergo sum, he had proved his own existence with certainty. It is more difficult to understand how he moves from the thesis that since he thinks therefore his existence is certain, to the thesis that his nature is nothing but thinking and he is entirely distinct from body.' His critic, Hobbes, regarded the transition from cogito ergo sum to sum res cogitans as obviously fallacious: was like saying am walking, hence I am the walking.2 Another contemporary, Arnauld, was unable to find in the Meditations anything like a sound proof of the doctrine sum res cogitans.3 Locke addressed himself to the Cartesian view that thinking is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is from the body.4 He saw no support for save an arbitrary stipulation: it is but defining the soul to be 'a substance that always thinks,' and the business is done.5 Locke added this tart comment: If such definition be of any authority, I know not what can serve for but to make many men suspect that they have no souls at all; since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking.6 It is not true that the business is done by a mere stipulation. Descartes supported the doctrine sum res cogitans with proofs. But is true that his explicit arguments do not have the force or

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy