The Relation between Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Propositions and Russell's Theories of Judgment

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10693371
AutoresDavid Pears (autor de correspondencia)
Año1977
Volumen86
Número2
Páginas177
Fecha de publicación1977-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2184005
OpenAlexW2324266139
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas13

w orm is the possibility of structure (Tractatus 2.033). My aim 1 in this paper is to show how far this idea, which is part of the picture theory, is a reaction against Russell's unpublished 1913 theory of propositions. 1 There is more to the picture theory than this, and more could be said about Russell's theories of propositions and judgement than is necessary for the presentation of his 1913 theory. But I shall confine myself to fixing the two points and drawing the line that connects them. There is a letter from Russell to Lady Ottoline Morell, dated 28 May 1913, in which he reports the fact that Wittgenstein had criticized the book that he was writing, but does not give the details of the criticism

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Relation (database) · Computer Science · Philosophy · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications