Freedom, Dependence, and the General Will

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10693396
AutoresFrederick Neuhouser (autor de correspondencia)
Año1993
Volumen102
Número3
Páginas363
Fecha de publicación1993-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2185902
OpenAlexW2329144747
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas31

Freedom, in contrast to independence, is defined without reference to the concept of need. It refers, rather, to a condition of the will, and more precisely, to a particular relation between the will and the world. The meaning of freedom is captured in a rough way by Rousseau's characterization of the free being as who does his own will. Rousseau's view of dependence as the source of subjection suggests one obvious response to his central question concerning the conditions under which freedom can be realized, namely, the perfect independence of all individuals. Rousseau's view of dependence as the source of subjection suggests one obvious response to his central question concerning the conditions under which freedom can be realized, namely, the perfect independence of all individuals. Because the freedom one enjoys on this scenario is independent of one's subjective relation to the principles that structure the social world, it could be termed a kind of objective freedom

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Economics · Epistemology · General interest · Law and economics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Political Theory and Influence · Rousseau and Enlightenment Thought