Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10693729
AutoresJohn R Silber (0000-0001-9828-7190, autor de correspondencia)
Año1959
Volumen68
Número4
Páginas469
Fecha de publicación1959-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2182492
OpenAlexW2317149788
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas32

THE concept of the highest good is proposed by Kant as the necessary material object of moral volition. This concept-whose analysis, deduction, and elaboration constitutes the central problem of the Critique of Practical Reason-gives concrete significance to moral obligation. No longer obligated to strive for the abstraction of good-willing itself as its object, the will is now guided by means of the idea of the highest good to seek its own moral perfection and the happiness of others as its categorically obligated ends. The idea of the highest good thereby provides the answer to the second of Kant's three basic questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?'

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy